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Abstract
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is
important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics.
However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms – which are based on off-
equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use
of arbitration – can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifi-
able. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations
of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption.
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this
paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limita-
tions. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the
parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates
the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that
individuals – if given the choice – opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the
cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems
but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mecha-
nisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to
solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally,
robust to other-regarding preferences.
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“To the extent that [existing institutions] do not replicate the performance of
[subgame-perfect implementation], one must ask why the market for institutions
has not stepped into the breach, an important unresolved question.”
-Eric Maskin (2002)
1 Introduction
Incomplete contracts pervade economic and political life. Politicians in executive positions
as well as bureaucrats in ministries and agencies act on the basis of loose objectives, and the
obligations of employees and managers in private organizations are often described in vague
terms. Economists have explored the implications of incomplete contracts by developing
models that assume that key payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable by
a third-party enforcer. Such observable but non-verifiable information implies that third
party enforcement of state-contingent contracts is infeasible and that formal contracting is
ineffective.
The tractable nature of models using the assumption of observable but non-verifiable
information has made them an essential tool for evaluating trade-offs in institutional design.
The assumption has been used to understand property rights and firm boundaries (Grossman
& Hart 1986; Hart & Moore 1990; Hart 1995), the optimal scope of governments (Hart,
Shleifer, & Vishny 1997; Besley & Ghatak 2001), problems of privatization (Schmidt 1996a,
1996b), the control of insiders by outsiders through voting rights (Grossman & Hart 1988;
Gromb 1993) and financial contracts (Aghion & Bolton 1992; Dewatripont & Tirole 1994;
Hart & Moore 1998), and patterns of international trade and technology adoption (Antras
2003; Nunn 2007; Acemoglu, Antras, & Helpman 2007).
In addition, the observable but non-verifiable assumption often underpins second-best
approaches to relational-contracting models in organizational economics (MacLeod & Mal-
comson 1989; Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy 1994, 2002; Levin 2003) and to efficiency-wage
models of motivation (MacLeod & Malcomson 1998; Board & Meyer-ter-Vehn 2014) where
signals of past behavior are mutually observable (so that players can coordinate on punish-
ment and rewards) but not verifiable by third parties.
However, despite its widespread influence, the assumption that payoff-relevant informa-
tion is observable but non-verifiable stands on controversial theoretical foundations. Building
on work by Moore & Repullo (1988), Maskin & Tirole (1999) show that if parties commonly
observe payoff-relevant information, there often exists an auxiliary extensive form mechanism
that can credibly make this information verifiable under subgame perfection. In particular,
they point out that there exists a subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanism that
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is capable of ensuring truthful revelation of mutually known, payoff-relevant information as
part of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore, even though payoff-relevant in-
formation may not be directly observable by third parties, truthful revelation of information
via the mechanism allows for indirect verification, which should make first-best outcomes
attainable.
Maskin and Tirole’s critique of the microfoundation of incomplete contracting models that
use the observable but non-verifiable information assumption is troubling in its implications.
Comparing the effectiveness of second-best institutional arrangements under incomplete con-
tracts is moot when a mechanism exists that is capable of achieving first-best outcomes. On
the other hand, the limited use of implementation mechanisms in environments with observ-
able but non-verifiable information leads one to question the assumptions of Maskin and
Tirole’s critique itself. Or to put it like Maskin (2002): why does the market not step in and
implement institutions that replicate the performance of efficient SPI mechanisms? If that
were the case, first best outcomes in many collective action, agency and institutional design
problems could be achieved.
In this paper, we explore Maskin’s question by studying the performance and adoption of
an SPI mechanism described in Maskin & Tirole (1999) that is designed to resolve the hold-
up problem in bilateral exchange with observable but non-verifiable ex-ante effort. We chose
this environment as it is the original environment for which observable but non-verifiable
information has been assumed, and because it is one of the canonical models in the theory
of the firm.
We find that, although the mechanism is predicted to induce perfect truth-telling and high
effort levels, it often fails to do either. In addition, the mechanism frequently has disastrous
welfare consequences for the involved parties because their behavior under the mechanism
deviates strongly from the predicted subgame-perfect equilibrium and these deviations lead
to the imposition of sizeable fines on both parties. Due to the frequently negative welfare
consequences of the mechanism, the trading parties opt out of the mechanism in the majority
of the cases when given the chance to do so. We believe these findings provide a plausible
explanation for the absence of the mechanism in real-world environments.
Why though, does the mechanism perform so badly relative to the theoretical predictions?
Answering this question is important because it may help theorists to design mechanisms
that are immune to the behavioral forces that render Maskin and Tirole’s SPI mechanism
so inefficient. To answer this question, we briefly need to describe the essential components
of the SPI mechanism.
In our experiment, a seller is selling a good to a buyer and may provide costly ex-ante
effort to increase the value of the good. Effort and the value of the good are commonly
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known to the trading parties, but they are not verifiable by a third-party court. This implies
that the two parties cannot write a contract that conditions payments on effort or the value
of the good and hence, any effort made by the seller is prone to hold up.
While effort is not verifiable by a third-party court, public announcements can be recorded
and used in legal proceedings. Thus, the two parties can in principle write a contract that
specifies trade prices as a function of announcements made by the buyer. If the buyer always
tells the truth, then his announcements can be used to set prices that promote efficient
effort. One way of doing this is to implement a mechanism that allows announcements to
be challenged by the seller and to punish the buyer any time he is challenged. If the seller
challenges only when the buyer has told a lie, then the threat of punishment will ensure
truth telling.
The crux of the implementation problem, then, is to give the seller the power to challenge
announcements, but to prevent “he said, she said” scenarios wherein the seller challenges
the buyer’s announcement when in fact he has told the truth. A key property of the SPI
mechanism is to set up an institution that combines the seller’s challenge with a fine for
the buyer as well as a test: if the seller challenges the buyer’s announcement, the buyer is
immediately fined and given a counter offer that he will only accept if he in fact originally
told a lie (for example, if the true value of the good is 200 and he announced that he valued
the good at 100, offer to sell it to him for 105). If the buyer accepts and thus reveals that
he was lying, the mechanism rewards the seller for appropriately challenging the buyer. If,
however, the buyer rejects the challenge, the mechanism also fines the seller and no trade
occurs.
Since the value of the good is common knowledge between the buyer and the seller,
the seller will only challenge if he knows the buyer will fail the test, because otherwise the
seller will be fined. Because the buyer understands that the seller has the incentive to only
challenge incorrect announcements, he will make a truthful announcement. Truth telling is
therefore part of the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the announcement game
and can be used to promote first-best effort levels.
We liken the SPI mechanism to handing out guns at a knife fight: the capability of
escalating potential losses from conflict can resolve disagreement without a shot ever being
fired. However, “handing out guns at a knife fight” will only lead to peaceful encounters if
important conditions are met. For example, a key requirement for the incentive to challenge
is that the sellers believe that buyers who lied will indeed accept the counter offer; if buyers
reject counter offers, the seller faces large costs from being fined. Likewise, a key requirement
for the buyer to have the incentive to tell the truth is that he expects the seller to challenge
him if he lies. Contrary to the prediction that the mechanism induces perfect truth-telling
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and high effort levels, the mechanism frequently fails to achieve either. In addition, sellers
often do not challenge buyers’ lies and buyers reject counter offers in the large majority
(80%) of the cases, leading to disastrous welfare consequences. Handing out guns at a knife
fight often escalates conflict rather than bringing about efficient agreements and peace.
While the mechanism fails at all behavioral stages, buyers’ and sellers’ action profiles and
beliefs suggest that deviations from the equilibrium predictions are systematic and internally
consistent. Buyers typically underreport the good’s value by a small amount. They correctly
believe that these “small lies” are unlikely to be challenged. Sellers correctly believe that
the buyers are likely to reject the counter offers associated with the challenging of small
lies and, therefore, the sellers challenge such lies infrequently. Finally, buyers who have been
challenged after a small lie indeed reject the counter offer in the vast majority of cases, which
leads to no trade and to both parties having to pay large fines.
No matter what their beliefs are, it is a dominant strategy for buyers to accept counter
offers after they have been challenged for small lies. If buyers acted in their pecuniary
interests, they would not reject such counter offers, and sellers would not need to fear the
high costs of rejected counter offers. The mechanism, therefore, would not unravel. Our
results indicate that the key to understanding the failure of the mechanism is to understand
buyers’ willingness to reject counter offers following appropriate challenges of small lies.
There are two classes of explanations for why buyers reject these counter offers. The first
is that these buyers are simply making random mistakes in choosing between two actions
when their private cost of mistakes is not very high. However, random errors cannot explain
why the buyers’ rejection rate is so high because the random mistake hypothesis also implies
that buyers accept counter offers when theory predicts they should reject them. The second
explanation is that buyers’ choices reflect more than just their pecuniary payoffs: buyers may
view challenges of small lies as an unkind act and retaliate against these acts by rejecting
the counter offer and inflicting costs on the sellers. In other words, the rejection of counter
offers is driven by negative reciprocity motives, which have consistently been shown to be
important in laboratory games (e.g., Blount 1995; Offerman 2002; Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher
2008) and field settings (e.g., Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde 2008; Kube, Mere´chal, &
Puppe 2013; Cohn, Fehr, Hermann, & Schneider 2011). It seems quite likely that the buyers
view the challenge of a false announcement, in particular if it involved only a small amount
of underreporting, as a hostile act, because it triggers the imposition of a large fine on the
buyer. However, large fines are a crucial part of SPI mechanisms, because they ensure in
theory (i.e., in the absence of non-selfish motives like negative reciprocity) that all incentive
compatibility conditions are met.
In the appendix, we introduce negative reciprocity motives into the model and show
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that there exist sequential-reciprocity equilibria with behavioral patterns similar to those
observed in our experiment. In particular, if subjects are motivated by reciprocity the
buyers are willing to reject counter offers after small lies even if they have weak preferences
for reciprocity, while the sellers shy away from challenging such announcements even if
they have strong preferences for reciprocity.1 In addition we provide more direct empirical
evidence that negative reciprocity plays a role. Two weeks prior to the experiment, we
measured subjects’ propensity for negative reciprocity with the “reciprocity questionnaire”
developed by Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani (2002). Buyers who have a strong
propensity for negative reciprocity are significantly more willing to make small lies. This
makes perfect sense, because these subjects knew that they were willing to reject counter
offers after small lies and were likely to be confident that sellers would not challenge such
lies.
The failure of the mechanism and the associated behavioral patterns prompted us to
run additional treatments where we tried to improve the performance of the mechanism. In
response to the high proportion of small lies, we implemented a treatment where the buyers
have a stronger incentive to tell the truth.2 A by-product of this change is that the buyers
now earn a larger share of the surplus in equilibrium. These changes in incentives lead to a
decrease in small lies and an increase in challenges of such lies. However, we still observed a
large number of rejections of counter offers after challenges with the associated bad conse-
quences that both parties pay fines and no trade takes place. Interestingly, this treatment
also generates over-reports from some buyers who fear that truthful announcements will be
challenged. Overall, this improved mechanism leads to small welfare gains after an initial
learning period (during which large welfare losses occurred), but if the trading parties are
given the chance to voluntarily opt out of the mechanism, only 35% of the buyer-seller pairs
keep the mechanism. Thus, taken together the improved mechanism also does not perform
in a promising way.
While the SPI literature is based on the assumption that fines can be unlimited and that
performance is likely to improve with fine size, large fines may lead to large losses by the
1In equilibrium, reciprocal sellers anticipate this rejection of counter offers, and thus view small lies as
unkind. However, the impact of their negative reciprocity on the action profile is muted due to an important
asymmetry in the mechanism. When the seller decides whether to retaliate against the buyers’ anticipated
rejection of a counter offer he can still avoid paying the fine by refraining from the challenge. This implies
that negatively reciprocating an unkind action by challenging is very costly for him. In contrast, when the
buyer decides whether to reject a counter offer, the fine has already been imposed on him and thus does not
count as a cost of rejection. For buyers, retaliation is much cheaper, implying that relatively weak reciprocity
motives may already trigger the buyers’ rejection of counter offers.
2This has been achieved by lowering the initial-price offer that is associated with the buyers’ announcement
while keeping the counter offer in case of a challenge the same as before. In this treatment, the buyers have
a stronger incentive to tell the truth because if they are not challenged they have to pay a lower initial price.
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buyer after a challenge and may be a driver of reciprocal behavior. Thus, in principle, a
reduction of the fine could reduce buyer retaliation and promote efficiency. Therefore, we
implemented a further treatment in which we reduced the fine substantially relative to the
main treatment, but we still ensured that all incentive compatibility conditions were met.
We hypothesized that a lower fine may reduce the perceived unkindness of a challenge and
may thus reduce the buyers’ rejection of counter offers, which may then lead to an increased
willingness to challenge among the sellers. As a consequence, both parties may display a
higher willingness to adopt the mechanism in the presence of smaller, yet still incentive
compatible, fines. However, behavior in the low-fine treatment does not lead to a substantial
improvement of the mechanism. The reduction of the fine leads to a substantial share of
large underreports, followed by an acceptance of the counter offer. This strategy makes sense
for a buyer who believes that truth-telling after high effort is also challenged; it is then better
to report the lowest possible value of the good – which ensures a low counter-offer price –
and accept the fine for being challenged. However, it leads to an aggregate truth-telling rate
of only 34.5%. In addition, the buyers’ rejection of counter offers after small underreports
is still very high (65%). Thus, the mechanism with smaller, yet incentive compatible, fines
is also not performing well and, as a consequence, the parties keep the mechanism only in
36% of the cases if they have the chance to opt out.
Taken together, our results suggest that the design of real-world mechanisms must ac-
count for the non-pecuniary characteristics of subjects’ preferences. Subgame-perfect imple-
mentation mechanisms designed under the assumption that participants are self-interested
perform poorly and are abandoned by participants. Our findings suggest that reciprocity
and other-regarding preferences may cripple proposed mechanisms in many settings. Viable
real world mechanisms need to be robust to the retaliatory inclinations of the people and
to beliefs about other players’ envy and retaliatory propensities. Our findings thus provide
exactly the kind of evidence that was asked for in the review paper in Moore (1992) who
stated: “Implementation theory should, I believe, be largely driven by applications; and in
principle each application should bring with it some assumption about how the agents in
that specific situation will plausibly behave.” Our results provide the type of information
that is needed to assess whether mechanisms are viable and induce truth-telling, and if they
fail to do so, why they fail. In addition, they have potentially important implications for
Maskin and Tirole’s critique of the micro-foundation of incomplete contracts that is based on
the observable but not verifiable assumption. The severe behavioral limitations of subgame
perfect implementation mechanisms documented in this paper may be one of the reasons
why the market for institutions has not stepped in and why incomplete contracts are so
frequent.
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Apart from speaking to the debate on the micro-foundation of incomplete contracts and
the justifiability of the observable but not verifiable assumption, our paper is also related
to the theoretical literature on the role of reciprocity in contract (Englmaier & Leider 2012;
Netzer & Volk 2014) and mechanism design (Bierbrauer & Netzer 20123), as well as to the
experimental literature that examines how negative reciprocity affects behavior in settings
with a hold up problem (e.g., Dufwenberg, Smith, & Essen 2011). However, none of these
papers empirically studies and identifies the behavioral limitations of subgame perfect im-
plementation mechanisms.
Finally, our paper also contributes to the experimental literature on implementation.
Sefton & Yavas (1996) study extensive-form Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms that vary in
the number of stages and find that incentive-compatible mechanisms with 8 and 12 stages
perform worse than a mechanism with four stages that is not incentive compatible. Ka-
tok, Sefton, & Yavas (2002) study both simultaneous and sequential versions of the Abreu-
Matsushima mechanism and conclude that individuals use only a limited number of iterations
of dominance and steps of backward induction. Based on these papers, we limited our at-
tention to mechanisms that required only two levels of backward induction.4 Our paper is
also related to the recent experimental work of Aghion, Fehr, Holden, & Wilkening (2014),
which tests the theoretical predictions of Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, & Tercieux
(2012). The theory paper shows that the absence of common knowledge about the state of
nature limits the performance of SPI mechanisms, and the experimental paper confirms this
prediction. This paper is thus complementary to the current paper which demonstrates that
subjects’ propensity to retaliate, and subjects’ beliefs about others’ social preferences and re-
taliatory tendencies thoroughly undermines SPI mechanisms. In addition, the current paper
directly studies how the SPI mechanism contributes to the solution of a hold-up problem,
whether subjects would be better off with the mechanism, and whether they voluntarily
accept the mechanism.
3Bierbrauer & Netzer (2012) use the Bayes-Nash fairness equilibrium as solution concept and provide
conditions under which a mechanism can be made robust to intention-based reciprocity. They show that
two-party problems such as the one studied here cannot be made fully robust to reciprocity since the insurance
property cannot be satisfied. The insurance property means that players cannot affect the other players’
payoffs by unilaterally deviating from truth-telling.
4An extensive experimental literature also exists looking at efficiency of implementation mechanisms
in the public goods provision problem. Chen & Plott (1996), Chen & Tang (1998), and Healy (2006)
highlight the importance of supermodularity in Groves–Ledyard mechanisms in improving public goods
provision. Andreoni & Varian (1999) and Falkinger, Fehr, Gachter, & Winter-Ebmer (2000) study two-stage
compensation mechanisms that build on work from Moore-Repullo (1988), while Harstad & Marese (1981,
1982), Attiyeh, Franciosi, & Isaac (2000), Arifovic & Ledyard (2004), and Bracht, Figuieres, & Ratto (2008)
study the voluntary contribution game, Groves–Ledyard, and Falkinger mechanisms respectively. Masuda,
Okano & Saijo (2014) study approval mechanisms and emphasize the need for implementation mechanisms
to be robust to multiple reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions.
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2 Subgame-Perfect Implementation
We begin with a description of a simplified version of the Maskin and Tirole mechanism and
highlight how it can solve the classic hold-up problem when effort is non-contractible. A
seller (S) and buyer (B) bargain over the production and exchange of a good. S can choose
an effort level e ∈ {eL, eH}, with eH > eL, to produce a good for B that has outside value
for the seller of v. Effort is privately costly to S but increases the value of the good to B.
Let vL and vH denote B’s valuation when S chooses eL and eH . Assume throughout that
vH − eH > vL − eL so that high effort is socially efficient.
The good’s value to B is observable to both parties but non-verifiable by a court. To
highlight the hold-up problem, assume that after S’s effort choice has been sunk, B makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to S, resulting in a trade price of p = v. Since the trade price does
not depend on S’s effort choice, S has no incentive to choose high effort even though doing
so would be socially efficient. Consequently, both parties would prefer a trade price that
is more sensitive to the actual value of the good, as such a price schedule would provide
incentives for S to choose high effort. Formal contracts written directly on this value cannot
be used. However, Maskin and Tirole suggest an indirect contract that can achieve the
first-best outcome if the parties use the following mechanism, which is based on Moore &
Repullo (1988):
1. B and S sign a contract with a third party, whom we will call the arbitrator. The
contract specifies (i) an initial-price schedule p (vˆ) at which trade may occur, given
an announcement vˆ that B makes in stage 3 and (ii) a counter-offer schedule pˆ (vˆ)
and fine F , which may jointly be used to mediate disagreement and will be discussed
below. Note that both p and pˆ are based only on B’s announcement, which can be
made publicly observable (and therefore verifiable).
2. S chooses effort e to produce a good of value v (e) ∈ V , which is commonly observed
by B and S.
3. B announces vˆ ∈ Vˆ = {v0, v1, . . . , vN}, where v0 ≤ vL < vH ≤ vN and V ⊂ Vˆ . vˆ is
observable to S and the arbitrator.
4. S may challenge the announcement. If he does not, trade occurs at price p (vˆ), and
the game ends. If he does, B pays a fine F to the arbitrator, and play proceeds.
5. B is given a counter offer pˆ (vˆ). If B accepts the counter offer and buys, he pays pˆ (vˆ)
and receives the good, and S is paid F by the arbitrator.
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6. If B does not buy, S gives the good to the arbitrator, and it is destroyed. Additionally,
S must also pay a fine F to the arbitrator.
A SPI mechanism, which we will denote by µ, is therefore a collection
(
p (·) , pˆ (·) , Vˆ , F
)
consisting of an initial-price schedule, a counter-offer schedule, an announcement space, and
a fine level. The logic of this mechanism is that the initial-price and counter-offer schedules
are constructed so that if B and S are commonly known to be sequentially rational, B never
has an incentive to announce a vˆ 6= v (e). For this to be true, the SPI mechanism µ must
satisfy three conditions.
(a) Counter-Offer Condition. B must prefer to accept any counter offer for which
he has announced vˆ < v (e) and reject any counter offer for which he has announced
vˆ ≥ v (e) .
(b) Appropriate-Challenge Condition. S must prefer to challenge announcements
vˆ < v (e) and not challenge announcements vˆ ≥ v (e).
(c) Truth-Telling Condition. B must prefer to announce vˆ = v (e) rather than vˆ 6=
v (e).
We refer to a challenge after vˆ < v (e) as an appropriate challenge and refer to a
challenge after vˆ ≥ v (e) as an inappropriate challenge. The counter-offer condition
requires that after an appropriate challenge the counter offer price is below the value of the
good, i.e., for each vˆ < v (e), pˆ (vˆ) < v (e). It also requires that after an inappropriate
challenge the counter offer price is above the value of the good, i.e., for each vˆ ≥ v (e),
pˆ (vˆ) ≥ v (e). The counter-offer condition implies that
pˆ(vi) ∈ [vi, vi+1) (1)
for all i < N . Note that the difference between pˆ(vi) and vi cannot be larger than the
difference between vi+1 and vi. Thus the maximum return to accepting a counter offer is
constrained by the coarseness of the announcement space.
Under a counter-offer schedule that satisfies the Counter-Offer Condition, B will reject
counter offers following inappropriate challenges and will accept counter offers following ap-
propriate challenges, so the Appropriate-Challenge Condition is satisfied if S has an incentive
to challenge only in cases where B will accept such a challenge (i.e., when B lied). The return
to S of appropriately challenging an announcement vˆ < v (e) relative to not challenging is
∆S (vˆ, F ) = pˆ (vˆ) + F − e− (p (vˆ)− e)
= pˆ (vˆ) + F − p (vˆ) . (2)
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Thus, the Appropriate-Challenge Condition is satisfied if ∆S (vˆ, F ) > 0 for all vˆ ∈ Vˆ .
This will be the case as long as the counter-offer price exceeds the initial price for each
announcement (i.e., pˆ (vˆ) > p (vˆ) for all vˆ) and F is positive.
Finally, for the Truth-Telling Condition to be satisfied, B must prefer to report the
actual value over any other value. If p (vˆ) is strictly increasing in vˆ, then overreported values
vˆ > v (e) (which by (b) will not be challenged by S) are never optimal for B. B’s pecuniary
returns to announcing the actual value v(e) relative to an underreported value vˆ < v (e) are
∆B (vˆ, v, F ) = v − p (v)− (v − pˆ (vˆ)− F )
= pˆ (vˆ) + F − p (v) . (3)
If ∆B (vˆ, v, F ) > 0 is satisfied for all v ∈ V ,vˆ ∈ Vˆ , then the Truth-Telling Condition is
satisfied. Since pˆ (vˆ) and p (v) are strictly increasing in vˆ and v, respectively, ∆B (vˆ, v, F ) > 0
is guaranteed for all vˆ and v if
pˆ (v0) + F ≥ p (vH) . (4)
The fine F is thus set to ensure that making the lowest announcement possible is not more
profitable than telling the truth.
Maskin and Tirole show that if F is allowed to be arbitrarily large, initial-price and
counter-offer schedules can be constructed such that a unique SPNE exists in which the
Counter-Offer, Appropriate-Challenge, and Truth-Telling Conditions hold, and B always
announces v truthfully in this SPNE. Because announcements are verifiable, the price sched-
ule p (vˆ) can then act as a complete contract, restoring S’s incentives to choose high effort.
Since total surplus is increased when S chooses high effort, prices can be set so that both
players prefer to subject themselves to the mechanism rather than to go without it.
3 Experimental Design
In section 3.1, we describe the SPI stage game we implement experimentally and highlight the
patterns of play that SPI theory predicts. Section 3.2 discusses several of our experimental
design features, and section 3.3 discusses our experimental protocol as well as secondary tasks
that we used to measure heterogeneity in preferences for negative reciprocity and aversion
to gambles.
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Table 1: Correspondence Between Announcement, Prices, and Outcomes in Main Treatment
(True Value = 120, Cost of Effort = 30) (True Value = 260, Cost of Effort = 120)
Value 
Announced       
i
Price Offered 
to Seller       
i
Counter‐Offer 
Price            
i
Buyer's Surplus if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Seller's Surplus  if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Buyer's Net Profit of 
Accepting  Counter 
Offer
Buyer's Surplus  if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Seller's Surplus  if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Buyer's Net Profit of 
Accepting  Counter 
Offer
100 70 105 50 40 15 190 ‐50 155
120 85 125 35 55 ‐5 175 ‐35 135
140 100 145 20 70 ‐25 160 ‐20 115
160 115 165 5 85 ‐45 145 ‐5 95
180 130 185 ‐10 100 ‐65 130 10 75
200 145 205 ‐25 115 ‐85 115 25 55
220 160 225 ‐40 130 ‐105 100 40 35
240 175 245 ‐55 145 ‐125 85 55 15
260 190 265 ‐70 160 ‐145 70 70 ‐5
280 205 285 ‐85 175 ‐165 55 85 ‐25
300 220 305 ‐100 190 ‐185 40 100 ‐45
Grey boxes in the "Buyer's Net Profit if No Challenge Occurs" columns show announcements for which a selfish buyer would accept the counter offer if
challenged. A selfish buyer will make the lowest possible announcement that is not challenged.  This will be an announcement of 260 after high effort 
and 120 after low effort.  As these are the true values, this mechanism induces truth telling.
High EffortLow Effort
vˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )p v p v
3.1 Main Treatment
At the center of our experimental design are two phases of the SPI mechanism described in
section 2. Both phases are computerized and vary only in the rules governing the mechanism’s
adoption.
Phase 1: In the initial 10 periods of each session, a seller S is perfect-stranger matched
with a buyer B and chooses an effort level for the production of a tradeable good. S has
two possible effort choices. Low effort generates a good B values at 120 at a cost of 30 to S.
High effort generates a good B values at 260 at a cost of 120 to S. B observes the actual
value of the good.
B then announces vˆ ∈ Vˆ = {100, 120, . . . , 260, 280, 300}. Note that Vˆ includes (i) the
true value for each potential effort choice, (ii) small lies below each true value, and (iii)
generous offers above each true value. We discuss this choice of announcement space in
Section 3.3.
The announcement vˆ affects both the price offered to B, p (vˆ), and the counter offer made
by the arbitrator, pˆ (vˆ), should S challenge vˆ. The price function is given by
p (vˆ) = 70 + 0.75 (vˆ − 100) ,
which is shown in column 2 of Table 1 for all possible announcements.
S may then accept the price p (vˆ) or challenge vˆ by calling the arbitrator, who makes
a counter offer to B. If S challenges vˆ, B immediately pays a fine of F = 250 and the
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counter-offer price is
pˆ (vˆ) = vˆ + 5.
If B accepts the counter offer, trade occurs at pˆ (vˆ), and S receives F = 250 from the arbi-
trator. If B rejects the counter offer, no trade occurs, and S is also fined F = 250. Note that
the cost of production has been sunk at the production phase. Under this parametrization,
S has the incentive to challenge vˆ < v (e) if he expects B to accept the counter offer if and
only if he has lied, since
∆S (vˆ, F ) = pˆ(vˆ) + F − p(vˆ) = 0.25vˆ + 260 > 0.
B always has the incentives to tell the truth if he anticipates a challenge otherwise, since
∆B (100, 260, F ) = 165 > 0.
Phase 2: In periods 11 − 20, B and S are given the choice to opt in or opt out of the
mechanism prior to S’s effort choice. We framed opting out of the mechanism as “dismissing
the arbitrator,” so that opting in is the status quo. If B and S opt in, they are informed that
the arbitrator is available, and play continues as in the first ten periods. If either party opts
out, the game is identical to the game in the first phase, except that S may not challenge vˆ,
and trade must occur at price p (vˆ). Both parties are informed about whether the arbitrator
is available but are not informed about the dismissal decision of the other party. This implies
that if a subject opts out, he cannot determine whether his counterparty opted in or out.
The mechanism µ, summarized in Table 1, satisfies the Counter-Offer, Appropriate-
Challenge, and Truth-Telling Conditions. As a result, the unique subgame-perfect equilib-
rium involves the following pattern of play.
SPI Hypothesis 1. The path of play under the SPI mechanism involves high effort, a
truthful announcement of 260, and no challenges. If S challenges an announcement of vˆ, B
accepts the counter offer if and only if vˆ < v (e).
We refer to the behavior described in SPI Hypothesis 1 as efficient truth-telling be-
havior and the resulting outcome as the efficient outcome. Note that in this equilibrium
B earns 70 and S earns 70. If either party opts out of the mechanism in the second phase,
the arbitrator is not available, and B will make the lowest possible announcement, vˆ = 100,
regardless of the true value. S has no incentive to choose high effort in this case and will
therefore choose low effort. Consequently, the SPNE payoffs if either party opts out are 50
for the buyer and 40 for the seller, so both parties are better off with the mechanism than
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without it. The SPNE thus predicts:
SPI Hypothesis 2. B and S opt into the mechanism in periods 11− 20.
3.2 Discussion of Design Features
As the goal of our experiment is to assess the plausibility of using SPI mechanisms in real-
world contracting environments, we make a number of design choices that can be divided
into roughly two categories: features that make the mechanism easier to implement experi-
mentally and features that broaden the applicability of the mechanism to richer settings.
To work toward this first objective, we focus on a subset of SPI mechanisms in which
the counter-offer schedule is independent of the good’s actual value. In more general envi-
ronments, following B’s announcement, S chooses a particular counter-offer that depends
on B’s announcement as well as the good’s actual value. For example, if the good is worth
v, and B announces any value other than v, S offers to sell the good to B at a price strictly
between B’s announcement and v. Additionally, to further reduce the cognitive complexity
of the experiment, we assume there are only two effort choices and two possible values for
the good.
Our choice of initial-price and counter-offer schedules is intended to favor the SPNE, in
which B’s and S’s receive an equal payoff of 70. Our expectation is that preferences for equity,
for which there is substantial evidence in laboratory experiments, makes the SPNE more
salient. Additionally, in designing the counter-offer schedule, we chose a parametrization
that gives most of the possible surplus from the counter offer to B. This increases B’s
value of accepting a challenge, again biasing play in favor of the SPI hypotheses. We also
transferred the entire fine F to the seller in the case of a successful challenge to maximize
S’s expected value to challenging.
Finally, to ensure that B has strict incentives to adopt the mechanism in the second
phase, we give B some of the surplus generated from efficient effort. Absent the mechanism,
the unique SPNE involves S choosing e = 30 and B announcing vˆ = 100, yielding payoffs of
50 to B and 40 to S. If the mechanism induces efficient behavior, B’s gains from adopting
it are 20, and S’s gains are 30.
Moore and Repullo show that in a broad class of environments that they refer to as
“economic environments,” any social choice function can be implemented using a three-
stage mechanism. In simpler environments, some social choice functions can be implemented
using two-stage mechanisms. For example, in our environment, the efficient outcome can
be implemented using a two-stage “option contract” (see, for example, No¨ldeke & Schmidt
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(1995)).5 We deliberately explore the performance of a three-stage mechanism in our simple
environment with one-sided hold-up and no uncertainty, because if such mechanisms fail to
work well in a simple environment, they are even more likely to fail in the more complex
environments that necessitate their use.
The specific three-stage mechanism we chose is richer than is necessary to generate ef-
ficient truth-telling behavior as the unique SPNE in our simple setting. For example, a
mechanism µ′ with the more coarse announcement space Vˆ ′ = {120, 260} but otherwise
identical initial-price and counter-offer schedules and fees to µ would still generate efficient
truth-telling behavior in our environment. However, in a richer environment with more pos-
sible effort choices for the seller (and therefore a richer space of valuations), the mechanism
µ′ would be unable to generate truth-telling behavior, and if there are different states of
the world in which different effort choices are jointly desirable, such a mechanism would not
yield efficiency. Enriching µ′ to include more potential announcements therefore expands
the applicability of the mechanism but also allows B to make small lies about the value
of the good. Of course, in the unique SPNE of the mechanism, these additional possible
announcements are irrelevant.
Finally, a larger fine slackens the Appropriate-Challenge and Truth-Telling Conditions,
and in our main treatment both are satisfied for any fine F > 85. According to SPI Hypoth-
esis 1, since a larger fine would also satisfy these conditions, our choice of F = 250 should not
affect the performance of the mechanism. We deliberately chose a high fine, because one of
the key steps in the constructive proofs of SPI mechanisms in the literature is showing that
all incentive-compatibility constraints can be satisfied if arbitrarily large fines are allowed.
3.3 Experimental Protocol
The experiments were run in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of
Melbourne in May and September of 2009 and were conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher
(2007)). All 280 subjects used in the Main Treatment and follow-up treatments (described
in Section 5) were undergraduate students at the University and were randomly invited from
a pool of more than 3000 volunteers using ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). Session sizes varied
from 20 to 26.
Two weeks prior to the experiment, subjects participated in a Personal Norms of Reci-
procity (PNR) survey developed by Perugini et. al. (2003). This survey consisted of 27
questions related to a subject’s inclination to punish hostile or reward kind acts. Using
principal-components analysis, these questions were combined into orthogonal measures of
5Hoppe & Schmitz (2011) experimentally study simple single-price option contracts in a one-sided hold-up
environment and find promising efficiency improvements even when renegotiation is allowed.
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positive and negative reciprocity for each subject. Subjects earned $10 for the survey and
a $10 show-up fee, which were used to insulate individuals from bankruptcy. The reci-
procity measures were done at the sign-up point rather than during the lab session in order
to mitigate demand effects that might occur from running the main treatment and survey
sequentially.
Upon arrival to the laboratory, subjects began by playing a lottery game to elicit aversion
to gambles. Each subject was presented with the opportunity to participate in six different
lotteries, each having the following form:
Win $12 with probability 1/2, lose X with probability 1/2. If subjects reject the
lottery, they receive $0.
The six lotteries varied in the amount X that could be lost, where X ∈ {4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14}.
One of the six gambles was randomly selected at the end of the experiment and paid.6
These lotteries enable us to construct a measure of heterogeneity in the willingness to accept
actuarially fair gambles. Discussion of the lottery task can be found in Fehr & Goette (2007)
and Fehr, Herz & Wilkening (2013).
Following the lottery task, subjects were assigned the role of B or S, which was fixed
for the duration of the experiment. Subjects were then asked to read the instructions and
answer a series of practice questions that were checked by the experimenter. These instruc-
tions explained the first phase of the experiment (in which the arbitrator is exogenously
available) as well as the rules regarding random matching and payment. The instructions
were accompanied by a detailed payment chart showing the price and counter offer for each
announcement as well as the payment to B and S for each potential outcome of the game.
The instructions explicitly explained how to read this chart, and subjects were required to
work through examples of play with announcements of 180 and 260 to ensure that everyone
understood the incentives of B and S after a truthful announcement and a lie.
Once the answers of all subjects were checked, the experimenter read aloud a summary
of the instructions. The purpose of the summary was to ensure that the main features of the
experiment were common knowledge amongst the participants. The oral instructions also
explained that there would be a second phase of the experiment and that instructions would
be handed out for this phase after the first phase was complete. Subjects were explicitly
informed that the second phase would be similar to the first and that their actions in the
first phase would have no influence on the rules and potential earnings of the second phase.
6The lottery treatment was run prior to the experiment to prevent strategic choices by subjects with
large losses from the main experiment who might have negative earnings under a subset of the lotteries. The
lottery treatment was resolved after the experiment to prevent endowment effects from impacting decisions
made in the experiment.
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To better understand the rationale for subjects’ choices, we also elicited beliefs about
B’s and S’s beliefs about the other parties’ likely actions. For B’s, we elicited the like-
lihood that S would challenge for each of the possible announcements given the effort
level actually chosen by the S. These likelihoods were elicited using a 4-point likert scale
(Never/Unlikely/Likely/Always) in each period following B’s announcement. Similarly, we
asked each S the likelihood that their challenge would be rejected if they were to challenge
B’s announcement. This belief was elicited directly after the decision to challenge or not
challenge B’s announcement.
The choice of unpaid beliefs for our main experiment were based on three considerations.
First, we wanted to have a full set of belief information including beliefs about counterfactual
actions. In order to elicit these beliefs in an incentive compatible way, we would have
had to use the strategy method for eliciting S’s challenges and B’s acceptance or rejection
decision. Given that the solution concept of subgame perfection is such an important part
of the implementation mechanism, we were averse to using the strategy method at interior
nodes. Second, we felt explaining an additional belief elicitation mechanism would take
attention away from the main experiment. Third, in games where both beliefs and action
are compensated, risk averse individuals may find it optimal to hedge risk by stating beliefs
which differ from their true estimates.7
The large fine size in the main treatment opened up the possibility that subjects could go
bankrupt. As such, the protocol for bankruptcy was made explicit to all subjects. Subjects
began the experiment with a $10 show-up fee and the $10 from the online survey. If a subject
accumulated $10 in losses, their money from the online survey payment was liquidated, and
they received a warning. If they lost all $20 of their initial endowment, they were removed
from the experiment. Over the main treatment and all follow-up sessions, two subjects
were removed from the experiment. In these cases, the lab manager took over the terminal
and played the SPNE equilibrium path actions as the B and exerted high effort and never
challenged any announcement as a S.8
4 Experimental Results of the Main Treatment
We describe the results of the Main Treatment in this section. Section 4.1 explores SPI
Hypothesis 1, examining play in the first ten periods of the experiment. Section 4.2 uses data
on beliefs to interpret some of the results in Section 4.1. Section 4.3 explores SPI Hypothesis
7See Blanco, Engelmann, Koch, & Normann (2010) for a discussion of hedging.
8All observations with the lab manager are excluded from the analysis. Bankruptcies occurred in one
session of the Main treatment and one session of the No-False-Challenge treatment. Removing these sessions
does not significantly affect the results.
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2. For purposes of categorizing data, we define to vˆ < v (e) as a lie, v (e) − 60 ≤ vˆ < v (e)
as a small lie, vˆ = v (e) as a truthful announcement, and vˆ > v (e) as a generous
announcement. We continue to define an appropriate challenge as a challenge of a lie
and an inappropriate challenge as a challenge of a truthful announcement or a generous
announcement.
4.1 Behavior Under the Mechanism
Under SPI Hypothesis 1, our experimental design generates sharp predictions about the
course of play: S will always choose high effort, B will always announce the actual value of
the good, S will challenge if and only if doing so is appropriate, and B will accept counter
offers if and only if they result from an appropriate challenge. The data from periods 1− 10
of our Main Treatment provide strikingly little support for SPI Hypothesis 1.
Result 1 (a) In a majority of cases B’s make small lies, (b) the large majority of these lies
are not challenged by the S’s, (c) the B’s reject counter offers in most cases, and (d), the
mechanism does not induce high effort in many cases. On average, (e) the parties would be
better off without the mechanism.
Figure 1 displays the patterns of play we observed in the first ten periods of the experi-
ment. The left column examines play following low effort (N = 200), and the right column
examines play following high effort (N = 260). Panel (a) summarizes B’s announcement
decisions, Panel (b) summarizes S’s challenge decisions for different announcements, and
Panel (c) summarizes B’s decisions to accept or reject counter offers. An observation is a
dyad-period.
Panel (a) shows that in the majority of observations, B’s lied: following high (low) effort,
only 38% (30%) of B’s announce the actual value of the good, while 54% (61%) make small
lies. Downward lies are increasingly less frequent the larger they are.
Panel (b) shows the proportion of S’s who challenge each announcement vˆ. SPI Hypoth-
esis 1 predicts that S’s challenge 100 percent of the time after a lie and never challenge after
a truthful or generous announcement. In the data, the challenge probability for small lies is
less than 30 percent.
Further, SPI Hypothesis 1 predicts that B’s will accept all counter offers following ap-
propriate challenges and reject all counter offers following inappropriate challenges. Panel
(c) shows that in the case of low effort, 21 out of 27 appropriate challenges are rejected; in
the case of high effort, 43 out of 52 appropriate challenges are rejected.
Finally, average surplus in periods 1 − 10 of the experiment for a buyer and seller pair
was only 7. To put this into perspective, average total surplus under the efficient outcome
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is 140. Average total surplus under the unique SPNE when the mechanism is unavailable
is 90. The realized gains from this mechanism relative to the maximum potential gains are
then 7−90
140−90 = −166%.
While the results in Figure 1 are presented as the aggregate of all 10 periods, there is
very little change in the pattern of play when looked at on a period by period basis. Figure 2
shows how effort, announcements and challenges of small lies evolve over the first ten periods.
As can be seen in panel (a), the proportion of sellers exerting high effort is relatively stable
over time with roughly 55% of the sellers exerting high effort each period.
Panel (b) shows the proportion of small lies, truthful announcements, and large lies or
generous offers over time. The proportion of small lies is stable and constitute roughly 55
percent of observations. The proportion of truthful announcements is increasing while the
proportion of individuals making other announcements (i.e., large lies or generous offers)
decreases rapidly. Only small lies and truthful announcements are observed by period 10.
While small lies are stable, the likelihood of a seller challenging such an announcement
is actually decreasing over time. As can be seen in panel (c), which shows the proportion
of small lies being challenged each period, sellers are very unlikely to challenge a small lie
in later periods. This reluctance makes sense given that the likelihood a buyer accepts a
counter offer is very low. This implies that the mechanism is actually moving away from the
truth-telling equilibrium since sellers are becoming more reluctant to challenge over time.
4.2 The Role of Beliefs
We next explore the role of a subject’s beliefs in shaping his or her decisions under the
mechanism. If S’s believe that counter offers following an appropriate challenge of a small
lie will be rejected, they will be reluctant to challenge such announcements. Likewise, if B’s
believe that small lies will not be challenged, they ought to be willing to underreport the
value of the good. We find evidence that S’s and B’s have these beliefs, and that S’s and
B’s who have these beliefs act accordingly.
Result 2 (a) Most B’s believe that being challenged for a small lie is unlikely or will never
occur. B’s who have these beliefs are more likely to lie than those who believe that S’s will
challenge them. (b) Most S’s believe that a challenge of a small lie is likely to be rejected or
will always be rejected. S’s who believe that their challenges will be rejected are significantly
less likely to challenge a small lie.
Recall that in each period, we elicited B’s beliefs about the likelihood of being challenged
for each potential announcement using a 4-point likert scale (Never/Unlikely/Likely/Always).
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Figure 3 shows the proportion of B’s who indicated “Never” or “Unlikely” for each announce-
ment after the seller exerts high effort. 82% of B’s believe that announcements of 240 are
never challenged or are unlikely to be challenged, and 66% believe that an announcement
of 220 is never challenged or is unlikely to be challenged. Similar results hold following low
effort choices where 52% of B’s believe that S is “Unlikely” to challenge or will “Never”
challenge an announcement of 100. These results suggest that B’s correctly forecast that
many S’s are reluctant to challenge a small lie.
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Figure 3: Proportion of buyers who believe that a given announcement will “Never” be
challenged or is “Unlikely” to be challenged after observing high effort.
To better understand the role that beliefs have in B’s announcements we look at the
decision of B’s to make small lies based on his belief about being challenged after such lies.
Table 2 reports the results of a probit regression where the dependent variable is 1 if a buyer
makes a small lie and 0 if the buyer makes a truthful announcement. We report regressions
for choices after high effort in regressions (1) and (2), choices after low effort in regressions
(3) and (4), and choices after both high and low effort in regressions (5) and (6).
In regressions (1), the small lie indicator is regressed on the belief that an announcement
of 240 — the smallest possible lie — will be challenged in cases where high effort occurs.9
Likewise, in regression (3), the indicator for small lies is regressed on the belief that an
announcement of 100 will be challenged in the case of low effort. We combine these beliefs
in regression (5). To allow for potential non-linearities in the belief data we treat B’s beliefs
as categorical data and split the 4-point likert scale into a series of dummy variables. We use
the category “Never” as the omitted dummy category. Errors are clustered at the individual
level for all regressions.
9We used the belief on 240 to keep the high and low effort regressions the same. Alternative specifications
that use combined measures from announcements of 200, 220, and 240 have similar coefficients and predictive
power.
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Beliefs about the likelihood of being challenged are a good predictor of B’s likelihood
of making a small lie. Based on the marginal effects of a probit regression, B’s are 36.6
percentage points less likely to lie after high effort if they believe that being challenged is
“Likely” relative to individuals who believe that this will “Never” occur. Likewise, they
are 56.2 percentage points less likely to make a small lie after low effort if they believe
that being challenged is “Likely.” The probability of making a small lie is decreasing as an
individual’s belief moves to more pessimistic categories suggesting a monotonic relationship
between beliefs and announcements.
As can be seen by referring back to Figure 3, while most B’s believe that truthful an-
nouncements will “Never” be challenged, a small subset of B’s have more pessimistic beliefs.
As the decision to make a small lie is based on the expected value of lying relative to the
expected value of telling the truth, such pessimistic beliefs should increase the likelihood
of B’s to make a small lie. To test for this relationship, we extend the probit regression
in equations (2), (4), and (6) to also include beliefs about being challenged after a truthful
announcement. As expected, individuals are more likely to lie as they become more pes-
simistic about being challenged after a truthful announcement. Thus optimistic beliefs about
being challenged after a lie and pessimistic beliefs about being challenged after a truthful
announcement appear to influence B’s announcement decision.
Turning to the beliefs of S’s, 72% (62%) of S’s who are confronted with a small lie
after high (low) effort believe that an appropriate challenge will “Never” be accepted or is
“Unlikely” to be accepted. Thus, S’s also correctly forecast that B’s are likely to reject
appropriate challenges.
As with B’s, S’s are not only correctly forecasting that appropriate challenges will be
rejected, they appear to use these beliefs to guide their decisions. Table 3 reports the
marginal effects of a probit regression where we regress an indicator for S’s challenge decision
on his beliefs. Data in these regressions are restricted to cases where the buyer makes a small
lie and are divided into the low effort case, the high effort case, and the combined case. As
can be seen in column (1), S’s who exert high effort and believe that it is “Likely” that their
challenge will be accepted are 39.1 percentage points more likely to challenge than S’s who
believe that their challenge will “Never” be accepted. Similarly, S’s who exert low effort and
believe that their challenge is “Likely” to be accepted are 81.7 percentage points more likely
to challenge than S’s who believe that their challenge will “Never” be accepted.
Taken together, our belief data suggests that individuals are correctly predicting devia-
tions from the SPI predictions in later stages of the game and are responding to these beliefs
in a consistent manner. The consistency in the data suggests that the model may be missing
an important force which exerts a systematic influence on beliefs and behavior. We return
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Table 2: Probit Regression of Small Lies by Buyers
Buyer's Belief that Seller Will 
Challenge Smallest Lie:
"Unlikely" ‐0.242 ** ‐0.320 *** ‐0.297 * ‐0.404 *** ‐0.245 ** ‐0.336 ***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.174) (0.187) (0.098) (0.102)
"Likely" ‐0.366 ** ‐0.549 *** ‐0.562 *** ‐0.685 *** ‐0.404 *** ‐0.600 ***
(0.154) (0.147) (0.159) (0.123) (0.109) (0.094)
"Always" ‐0.487 *** ‐0.614 *** ‐0.639 *** ‐0.934 *** ‐0.491 *** ‐0.704 ***
(0.160) (0.104) (0.151) (0.029) (0.118) (0.063)
Buyer's Belief that  Seller will 
Challenge a Truthful  Announcement:
 "Unlikely" ‐ 0.232 ** ‐ 0.180 ‐ 0.228 ***
(0.109) (0.126) (0.083)
"Likely" ‐ 0.359 *** ‐ 0.193 * ‐ 0.271 ***
(0.099) (0.114) (0.073)
"Always" ‐ 0.225 ‐ 0.633 *** ‐ 0.358 ***
(0.226) (0.061) (0.068)
Psuedo R 2 0.061 0.100 0.148 0.220 0.076 0.116
Observations 237 237 183 183 420 420
Marginal effects from a probit regression are reported in the table where the dependent variable is 1 if the buyer makes
 a small lie and 0 if the buyer makes a truthful announcement. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.
The ommited category is Seller "Never" Challenges.  Regression (1) and (2) restrict the sample to periods where High 
effort is chosen.  Regressions (3) and (4) restrict the sample to periods where Low effort is chosen. *,**,*** denote 
siginificance at the 10%, 5% and 1%‐level, respectively.
Combined
(5) (6)
High Effort Low Effort
(3)(2) (4)(1)
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Table 3: Probit Regression of Challenges of Sellers After A Small Lie
Sellers Belief: Acceptance of Appropriate Challenge "Unlikely" 0.165 0.083 0.108
(0.131) (0.131) (0.088)
Sellers Belief: Acceptance  of Appropriate Challenge "Likely" 0.391 *** 0.817 *** 0.604 ***
(0.121) (0.089) (0.089)
Sellers Belief: Appropriate Challenge "Always" Accepted 0.504 *** 0.678 *** 0.586 ***
(0.187) (0.155) (0.111)
Psuedo R 2 0.110 0.471 0.252
Observations 122 141 263
Marginal effects from a probit regression are reported in the table where the dependent variable is 1 if
the seller challenges a small lie and 0 if the seller doesn't challenge. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by individual.  The omitted category is Buyer "Never" Accepts.  Regression (1) restricts the
sample to periods with High Effort and a Small Lie.  Regressions (2) restricts the sampe to periods with
Low Effort and a Small Lie. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%‐level, respecively.
Combined
(3)
High  Effort Low Effort
(1) (2)
to this issue after reporting the results from the second phase of the experiment.
4.3 Selection of the Mechanism
We now examine data from the second phase of the experiment, where subjects were given
the option to opt out of the mechanism. SPI Hypothesis 2 predicts all B’s and S’s would
opt into the mechanism, since absent the mechanism, S’s would always choose low effort.
The results are largely inconsistent with this hypothesis.
Result 3 A majority of dyads opt out of the mechanism. Although the proportion of S’s
who choose high effort is greater when the mechanism exists, both B’s and S’s are better off
when the mechanism is unavailable than when it is available.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows the opt-out behavior for buyers and sellers over the last 10
periods of the experiment. On average, 65% of dyads have at least one subject choosing
to opt out of the mechanism. While this opt-out rate is decreasing over periods 11-15, the
opt-out rate continues to be high, with at least 50% of groups opting out of the mechanism
in every period. B’s are much more likely to opt out of the mechanism (as they did in 58%
of the cases) than S’s are. The latter opt out of the mechanism in only 16% of the cases.
In the unique SPNE of the game without the mechanism available, the hold-up problem
is predicted to be unresolved: S’s are predicted to choose low effort and B’s are predicted
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to make the smallest possible announcement. As can be seen on the right hand side of
panel (b), these predictions hold true. When either party opts out of the mechanism, 273
out of 298 sellers exert low effort. In 262 of these cases, B announces vˆ = 100. Of the 25
observations where the seller put in high effort, B was truthful in only 3 cases, made a small
lie in 7 cases, and made the maximal lie of vˆ = 100 in 15.
For those periods in which both subjects opted in, we conjectured that the mechanism
would perform better than it did in the first phase of the experiment, since opting into the
mechanism ought to serve as a positive signal to the other subject in the dyad. From the
perspective of effort, this conjecture appears to hold; 114 out of 162 sellers (70%) who had
access to the mechanism exerted high effort in periods 11-20 whereas high effort was observed
in only 260 out of 460 cases (56.5%) in the first 10 periods. However, when the mechanism
is kept, buyers still make small lies in 32 out of 48 cases (66%) after low effort and in 66
out of 114 cases (57%) after high effort. These lying rates are similar to the first 10 periods
where the rate of small lies was 61% after low effort and 54% after high effort. Across both
effort levels, small lies were challenged in only 13 out of 98 cases (13%), a rate that is similar
to periods 8-10.
Empirically, both B’s and S’s earned lower average payoffs in periods in which both
subjects opted in than in those in which at least one subject opted out: for observations in
which the mechanism was available, average total surplus was 56.4 (36.8 for B’s and 19.6 for
S’s), while for dyad-periods in which the mechanism was unavailable, average total surplus
was 94.1 (57.4 for B’s and 36.7 for S’s).
Given that both B’s and S’s are worse off with the mechanism, an immediate question
arises as to why B’s opt out of the mechanism with greater frequency. One likely answer
is that the S’s can always avoid potential states of disagreement by exerting low effort and
never challenging B. Thus, a seller can always guarantee a payment at least as high as the
SPNE of the game without the mechanism with 100% certainty.
B’s by contrast must contend with the potential that they will be challenged. Without
the mechanism, B’s can guarantee themselves a payoff of 50 by making the lowest possible
announcement. With the mechanism, the buyer profit is influenced by (a) the probability
that the seller exerts high effort and (b) the probability that the seller will challenge a
truthful announcement or a small lie. As both these actions are dependent on the actions
of the other player, the mechanism exposes the buyer to uncertainty that he cannot avoid
through his choices.
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(a)  Proportion of buyers and sellers opting out of mechanism each period
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(b)  Buyer and seller outcomes with and without SPI mechanism
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Figure 4: Behavior in Last 10 Periods (Second Phase) of Main Treatment
26
5 Discussion of Main-Treatment Results
The data soundly reject SPI Hypotheses 1 and 2. However, the mechanism fails at all
behavioral stages in a way that is “internally consistent.” If B’s reject counter offers following
appropriate challenges of small lies, then S’s have a good reason to shy away from challenging,
because it is very costly for them. Yet, if S’s do not appropriately challenge small lies, then
B’s have pecuniary incentives to underreport the value of the good. Indeed, the beliefs data
support the above rationale for the failure of the mechanism. S’s who believe that counter
offers following appropriate challenges of small lies will be rejected are significantly less likely
to make such challenges. B’s who believe that they will not be challenged for small lies are
considerably more likely to make small lies.
Further, S’s are right to believe that B’s will reject counter offers following appropriate
challenges of small lies. Although many S’s do not challenge such lies, some do. In these
cases, the counter offer is almost always rejected, both parties incur large fines, and no trade
takes place. Therefore, the aggregate welfare gains generated by the mechanism are negative.
On average, it would be better for the parties to trade the good at low quality without the
mechanism than to adopt the mechanism, which explains the observation that the players
often do not adopt the mechanism when given the choice.
No matter what their beliefs are, it is a dominant strategy for B’s to accept counter
offers following appropriate challenges of small lies. If B’s acted in their pecuniary interests,
they would not reject such counter offers and S’s would not need to fear the high costs of
unsuccessful challenges. The mechanism, therefore, would not unravel. Our results indicate
that the key to understanding the failure of the mechanism is to understand B’s willingness
to reject counter offers following appropriate challenges of small lies.
5.1 Exploring potential reasons for rejections of counter offers fol-
lowing appropriate challenges.
Mistakes— A natural initial hypothesis for the observed pattern of play is that subjects make
errors in choosing which pure action to play and that they are more likely to choose pure
actions that involve higher expected payoffs. In extensive form games, a useful way to model
such errors is with an Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium (AQRE). AQRE is similar to
a standard quantal response model with the additional assumption that at a given decision
node, the player determines the expected payoff of each action by treating their future self
as an independent player with a known probability distribution over actions.
In an AQRE, the rejection of counter offers after small lies can be partially explained by
noting that the expected utility of accepting and rejecting a challenge are similar. Relative
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to larger lies (where the difference between accepting and rejecting a challenge is large),
AQRE predicts that buyers are more likely to reject challenges after a small lie. Forecasting
the errors of B’s, S’s may be less likely to challenge small lies. Likewise, B’s who correctly
forecast S’s reluctance to challenge may be more likely to make small lies. Thus, the in-
troduction of errors can generate deviations that are directionally consistent with a major
feature of the data.
While the structure of AQRE can match portions of the pattern of play, it cannot match
the magnitude of rejections. In any QRE model with symmetric noise, a choice that has
higher expected utility must be chosen with higher frequency than one with a lower expected
utility. Since accepting an appropriate challenge generates higher returns by construction,
the maximum rejection rate that can be predicted is 1/2. Given that 94.4% of appropriate
challenges were rejected after high effort and a small lie, AQRE on its own has a hard time
fully rationalizing the data.10
Retaliation— A second plausible hypothesis is that B’s have a preference for retaliation.
In our mechanism, after B’s announcement has been challenged, B must immediately pay
a fine F . B is then presented with two options. He can either buy the good (receiving
v − pˆ (vˆ) − F ) and “reveal” that he has told a lie, or he can choose not to buy the good
(receiving −F ) and “reveal” that he has told the truth. In the former case, S receives F as
a reward and pˆ (vˆ) as compensation for the good. In the latter case, he receives −F . The
private cost to B of choosing the latter is v − pˆ (vˆ), but the cost to S is pˆ (vˆ) + 2F . If B
receives a psychic reward of r (vˆ, v, F ) for punishing a perceived unkind act, he will do so
whenever
r (vˆ, v, F ) ≥ v − pˆ (vˆ) . (6)
The right-hand side of this inequality may be very small when vˆ is close to v. Thus for small
lies, B may retaliate.
Further, given that only modest preferences for retaliation are necessary to induce B
not to buy the good following an appropriate challenge, S may prefer to challenge B’s
announcement only in the most egregious of circumstances: small lies may go unchallenged
due to a fear of retaliation. Finally, B’s may anticipate this fear. When deciding whether or
not to announce vˆ = v (e), if B is forward-looking and recognizes that S may not challenge
small lies out of fear of retaliation, then he has an incentive to tell a lie.
The r (vˆ, v, F ) representation of preferences for retaliation is reduced form. However,
using a slight modification of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), we show in the appendix
that a modest preference for negative reciprocity can support a sequential reciprocity equi-
10Level-k and other cognitive hierarchy models have a similar difficult time fitting the extent of rejection
by B’s since only type-0 individuals will reject an appropriate challenge.
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librium in which B makes small lies, and S does not challenge these lies. We further demon-
strate that when B’s preferences for negative reciprocity are drawn from a distribution, and
the realization is B’s private information, even a B who is fully self-interested may antici-
pate S’s fear of challenging and also lie. This anticipation of fear may ultimately lead to a
partial-pooling equilibrium in which S challenges with small probability, and disagreements
are common. The losses generated in equilibrium may be enough for parties to opt out of
the mechanism or for S to always choose low effort (and thus minimize his own private costs)
under the mechanism.
5.2 External Measures of Negative Reciprocity
Two weeks prior to the experiment, we collected data on individual preferences for negative
reciprocity using the Personal Norms of Reciprocity (PNR) survey. If negative reciprocity is
the key force responsible for the prevalence of lies, we should see a between-subject correlation
between a measure of preferences for negative reciprocity and the propensity to make a small
lie.
Based on a simple model with reciprocity and no noise discussed in the appendix, the
relationship between negative reciprocity and small lies is expected to be weakly monotonic
but potentially non-linear.11 Given this potential non-linear relationship, we construct a bi-
nary measure of negative reciprocity that is less sensitive to non-linearities in the relationship
between negative reciprocity and small lies. The measure is constructed as follows: we first
generate a negative reciprocity score constructed by applying principal-component analysis
to the PNR survey using the procedures outlined in Perugini et. al. (2003). Individuals who
are more negatively reciprocal score higher on this measure. We then divide these scores at
the median to construct a binary variable that is 0 for less reciprocal individuals and 1 for
more reciprocal individuals.
Table 4 shows the marginal effects of the negative reciprocity measures in an extension
of the probit regressions performed in Table 2. As in the earlier regression, the independent
variable is a binary variable that is 1 if an individual makes a small lie in the period and
0 if the individual makes a truthful announcement. The regression includes controls for
beliefs about (i) the likelihood of being challenged after a truthful announcement and (ii)
the likelihood of being challenged after a small lie. These beliefs are coded as categorical
11This is due to two forces that exist in heterogenous models but not in models with a single type. First,
in the absence of strategic incentives to mimic other types, the decision to lie is based on a set of threshold
conditions where individuals with similar levels of reciprocity will pool on the same announcements. This
will lead to discrete jumps in announcements over the type distribution. Second, in any equilibrium where
S’s are reluctant to challenge, less reciprocal B’s will want to pretend to be more reciprocal. This mimicry
will lead to mixing which implies even non-reciprocal types will lie with positive probability.
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data in the same way as they are done in the previous regressions.
Column (1) reports the marginal impact of negative reciprocity on the likelihood of
making a small lie in periods where High effort occurs. As can be seen in column (1)
individuals who are above the median of the negative reciprocity score are 28.5 percentage
points more likely to make a small lie relative to those below the median, a difference that is
significant (p-value < .01). Column (2) reports the marginal impact of negative reciprocity
on the likelihood of making a small lie in periods when Low effort occurs. As in the High
effort case, the impact of reciprocity on the propensity to lie is positive. However, it is not
significant.
Pooling the data after high and low effort, column (3) shows that negative reciprocity
has a significant impact on the likelihood of a small lie in the full sample. Across both high
and low effort, individuals who are above the median of the negative reciprocity score are
21.9 percentage points more likely to make a small lie relative to those below the median, a
difference that is significant (p-value = .015).
Table 4: Probit Regression of Small Lies by Buyers
Negative Reciprocity Above Median 0.285 *** 0.125 0.219 **
(0.107) (0.121) (0.090)
Controls
Buyer's Beliefs: Challenges of Smallest Lie Yes Yes Yes
Buyer's Beliefs: Challenges of Truthful Announcements Yes Yes Yes
Psuedo R 2 0.162 0.237 0.152
Observations 230 180 410
Marginal effects from a probit regression are reported in the table. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual.  The
ommited category is Seller "Never" Challenges.  Regression (1) restricts the sample to periods where High effort is chosen.  Regression
(2) restricts the sample to periods where Low effort is chosen.  *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%‐level, respecively.
(1) (2) (3)
High Effort Low Effort Combined
We might also expect a strong relationship between S’s willingness to challenge and
his level of negative reciprocity. However, as described in the appendix, S preferences for
reciprocity must be very strong in order to be willing to challenge a B that will surely
retaliate. Thus, we would instead predict that negative reciprocity is a weak force in the
decisions of the sellers. This is indeed the case: extending the probit regression in Table
3 to include negative reciprocity shows that S’s with negative reciprocity scores above the
median are not significantly more likely to challenge after high effort (p-value = .770), low
effort (p-value = .832), or in the combined sample (p-value = .640).
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Taken together, preferences for retaliation appear to be important for rationalizing the
observed patterns of play. In the next section, we will take this idea seriously and explore a
number of additional treatments that seek to improve the mechanism’s performance in the
presence of subjects with preferences for retaliation.
6 Toward a Retaliation-Robust Mechanism
The Maskin and Tirole mechanism is based on three conditions that must be satisfied in order
for the mechanism to function: the counter-offer condition, the appropriate-challenge condi-
tion and the truth-telling condition. Sections 4 and 5 provide evidence that the counter-offer
condition fails due to reciprocity leading to further violations in the appropriate challenge
condition and the truth-telling condition.
In this section we run two additional treatments aimed at improving the mechanism.
The first treatment, the High-Benefits Treatment, makes changes to the initial-price
schedule that increases the expected value of truth-telling for B’s relative to small lies. By
making truthful reports more attractive it is predicted that the truth-telling condition will
be satisfied for a larger subset of B’s even if the other two conditions do not fully subscribe
to the SPI hypothesis.
In the second treatment, the Low-Fine Treatment, our goal is to reduce the degree
to which B’s want to retaliate by reducing the fine F . If B’s propensity to retaliate is
related to the magnitude of his losses due to a challenge, or the extent to which rejecting the
challenge reduces S’s profit, reducing the fine should reduce the willingness of some B’s to
reject appropriate challenges. Our second treatment thus targets the counter-offer condition
and aims to increase truth-telling indirectly.
6.1 High-Benefits Treatment
Under the SPI hypothesis, the appropriate-challenge condition predicts that S’s always chal-
lenge a lie and never challenge a truthful or generous offer. As was seen in panel (b) of Figure
1, the seller’s do not behave in accordance with this condition, because small lies are chal-
lenged infrequently.
While the appropriate-challenge condition is violated, the likelihood that S will challenge
is decreasing in the size of B’s announcements. Thus, the empirical distribution of S’s
challenges continues to satisfy at least one central property of the original appropriate-
challenge condition: small lies are more likely to be challenged than truthful announcements.
We take advantage of this property in the following High-Benefits treatment.
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The decision for a buyer to make a truthful announcement or a small lie is based on B’s
expected utility for telling the truth relative to the expected utility of lying. This implies
that any change in the SPI mechanism that increases the utility of truth-telling relative to
small lies has the potential of inducing B to make a truthful report.
A buyer is less likely to be challenged after a truthful announcement than a small lie.
This implies that if the value that a buyer receives when he is not challenged increases by
a constant across all potential announcements, the expected value of announcing a truthful
announcement will increase by more than the expected value of announcing a small lie. For
example, if a B believes that a small lie will be challenged 50% of the time and a truthful
announcement will never be challenged, then an increase in the value of not being challenged
of 10 will increase the expected value of the small lie by 5 (10 ∗ .5) and increase the value of
truth telling by 10.
In the High Benefits treatment we make precisely this type of shift in the value of not
being challenged by decreasing the initial-price schedule p(v) uniformly across all announce-
ment. The structure of this treatment is just as in the main treatment except that we
decrease the price p (vˆ) by 20:
p (vˆ) = 50 + .75 (vˆ − 100) .
As the change involves a constant shift in the initial-price schedule, it does not affect the pre-
dictions from the SPI hypothesis. This can be seen in Table 5, which summarizes the payoffs
for each potential choice within the treatment. However, holding the challenge probabilities
of the seller fixed, the treatment is predicted to increase the value of announcements where
the buyer believes there is a low probability of being challenged relative to announcements
where the buyer believes there is a high probability of being challenged. We thus expect more
truthful announcements, fewer small lies, and (by backward induction) a higher proportion
of S’s exerting high effort.
The High-Benefits treatment consisted of two sessions with 26 subjects in each session,
and we find the following:
Result 4 The High-Benefits Treatment has a larger proportion of S’s who exert high effort
than the Main Treatment. It also has fewer small lies and S’s are more likely to challenge
these lies. However, B’s still retaliate against most challenges, leading to inefficiency. Thus,
although the High-Benefits Treatment improves the efficiency of the mechanism relative to
the Main Treatment, the mechanism’s efficiency still remains very low.
Figure 5 displays the results for the High-Benefits Treatment with data aggregated across
all 10 periods: The left-hand side of the figure follows the pattern of play after S selects low
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Table 5: Correspondence Between Announcement, Prices, and Outcomes in High-Benefits
Treatment
(True Value = 120, Cost of Effort = 30) (True Value = 260, Cost of Effort = 120)
Value 
Announced       
i
Price Offered 
to Seller       
i
Counter‐Offer 
Price            
i
Buyer's Surplus if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Seller's Surplus  if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Buyer's Net Profit of 
Accepting  Counter 
Offer
Buyer's Surplus  if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Seller's Surplus  if 
No Challenge 
Occurs
Buyer's Net Profit of 
Accepting  Counter 
Offer
100 50 105 70 20 15 210 ‐70 155
120 65 125 55 35 ‐5 195 ‐55 135
140 80 145 40 50 ‐25 180 ‐40 115
160 95 165 25 65 ‐45 165 ‐25 95
180 110 185 10 80 ‐65 150 ‐10 75
200 125 205 ‐5 95 ‐85 135 5 55
220 140 225 ‐20 110 ‐105 120 20 35
240 155 245 ‐35 125 ‐125 105 35 15
260 170 265 ‐50 140 ‐145 90 50 ‐5
280 185 285 ‐65 155 ‐165 75 65 ‐25
300 200 305 ‐80 170 ‐185 60 80 ‐45
Grey boxes in the "Buyer's Net Profit if No Challenge Occurs" columns show announcements for which a selfish buyer would accept the counter offer if
challenged. A selfish buyer will make the lowest possible announcement that is not challenged.  This will be an announcement of 260 after high effort 
and 120 after low effort.  Thus the SPNE with selfish players in this treatment is the same as the Main treatment.
Low Effort High Effort
vˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )p v p v
effort (N = 66) while the right-hand side of the figure follows the pattern of play following
high effort (N = 194). Directly comparable to Figure 1, panel (a) shows the distribution of
announcements, panel (b) shows the likelihood of a challenge after each announcement, and
panel (c) shows the frequency that a challenge is accepted or rejected.
Comparing the proportion of S’s who exert high effort in the Main and High-Benefits
treatments, the High-Benefits treatment has a larger proportion of S’s who choose high effort.
In the Main Treatment, S’s select high effort in only 260 out of 460 observations (56.5%),
while S’s in the High-Benefits treatment choose high effort in 194 out of 260 observations
(74.6%). This difference is significant in a simple regression where effort choice is regressed
on the treatment variable with errors clustered at the individual level (p-value = 0.018).
Similar results hold for a rank-sum test where an observation is the proportion of time that
a subject chooses high effort (p-value = 0.037).
Controlling for the difference in effort levels, the High-Benefits Treatment also has signif-
icantly fewer lies than in the Main Treatment. Panel (a) shows that small lies occur in only
11 out of 66 cases after low effort (16.7%) and 30 out of 194 cases after high effort (15.5%).
These small lie rates are very low relative to the Main Treatment where lies occurred 61.0%
of the time after low effort and 54.2% of the time after high effort. The difference in the
propensity to make small lies between the two treatments is statistically significantly differ-
ent in two separate probit regressions — one for low effort and one for high effort — where
a binary variable that is 1 for a small lie and 0 for a truthful announcement is regressed
on the treatment variable (p-value < .01 for both regressions with errors clustered by indi-
vidual). Alternatively, clustered versions of the Mann-Whitney rank sum test developed by
33
Datta and Satten (2005) yield similar results (p-value < 0.01 after both high and low effort).
Interestingly, unlike the Main Treatment, B’s in the High-Benefits Treatment now make
generous announcements, vˆ > v(e). For example, after high effort buyers make generous
announcements in 37.6% of the cases. The large proportion of these generous offers suggests
a new deviation from the SPNE model that did not occur in the Main Treatment. We return
to this issue when we discuss the beliefs data below.
Looking at Panel (b) and comparing it to the main treatment, S’s are much more likely
to challenge small lies in the High-Benefits Treatment: following high effort, announcements
of 240 are challenged 58.3% of the time as compared to 17.7% of the time in the Main
Treatment. These differences are statistically significant, based on a probit regression of an
indicator that is 1 if S challenges and 0 otherwise on the treatment variable, with errors
clustered at the individual level (p-value < 0.01).
Despite the apparent increase in effort and decrease in small lies, retaliation is still fre-
quent in our data. Panel (c) shows that B’s reject the vast majority of legitimate challenges
after both high and low effort (80% after high; 75% after low), just as in the Main Treat-
ment. Thus, while the High-Benefits treatment increases truth-telling and the proportion of
appropriate challenges, it does not reduce retaliation.
Taken together, the High-Benefits treatment has a larger proportion of truthful announce-
ments and higher effort than the Main Treatment. However, the losses that occur due to
disagreement in early periods of the experiment are larger than the gains that occur from
improvements in effort and therefore the mechanism continues to reduce overall welfare.
Looking at the first five periods of the experiment, for example, the average total surplus of
a dyad pair is −7.9. Relative to the guaranteed gains of 90 for a pair without the mechanism
and the potential surplus of 140 with the mechanism, the realized gains from the mechanism
of −7.9−90
140−90 = −195.8% is strongly negative. The mechanism performs better in periods 6-10
where the average total surplus of a dyad pair is 97.9 (a realized gain of 15.8%) but these
gains cannot offset the early losses that arise from disagreement.
Given the improvement in efficiency, the greater level of truth telling, and the reduction
in disagreements over time, we might expect that B’s and S’s are more likely to opt into
the mechanism in this treatment. However, we find no significant difference in the overall
opt-out rates in the second phase of the experiment.
Result 5 In a majority of cases, the parties do not adopt the mechanism. This is largely
due to B’s dismissal of the mechanism which stems from Bs’ high propensity to render the
mechanism unprofitable by making generous announcements. Generous announcements are
caused by Bs’ beliefs that truthful announcements are challenged.
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Figure 5: Pattern of Play in High-Benefits Treatment
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Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows the opt-out behavior of B’s and S’s over the ten periods
of the treatment. As can be seen, B’s opt out rate is 80.8% in period 11 and converges
to 57.7% by period 20. The average opt-out rate of 64.6% is higher but not significantly
different from the average opt-out rate of 57.6% in the Main treatment (p-value = 0.181).
S’s opt-out rates in the High-Benefits Treatment is low at 3.4%, suggesting that the high
opt-out rate is primarily due to the dismissal of the mechanism by B’s.
As with the Main Treatment, in periods without the mechanism, the hold-up problem is
unresolved. As seen in panel (b), when either party opts out of the mechanism, 154 out of
171 S’s exert low effort. In 134 of these cases B announces vˆ = 100. Of the 17 observations
where high effort is observed, B makes a maximal lie of vˆ = 100 in 9 of them.
For those periods in which both subjects opted in, high effort is observed in 79 out of 89
cases. Buyers who keep the mechanism make truthful announcements in 46 cases, generous
offers in 25 cases, and small lies in only 8 cases. The increase in truthful announcements
and generous offers results in only 2 challenges and raises the overall average surplus of a
buyer and seller pair to 108.4 relative to 95.0 when the arbitrator is dismissed. However,
the increase in average efficiency is enjoyed primarily by the sellers; looking at B’s profits in
isolation, B’s expected profits actually decrease from 76.4 when the mechanism is dismissed
to 71.1 when the mechanism is kept. Thus the decrease in S’s opt-out rate and the lack
of change in B’s opt-out rate can be explained in part by an asymmetric return on the
mechanisms adoption.
The asymmetric return to the adoption of the mechanism is due primarily to B’s generous
announcements. Relative to the SPNE without the mechanism where low effort is exerted
and B announces a value of 100, the SPNE with the mechanism available leads to an increase
in B’s payoffs of 20 and an increase in S payoffs of 30. When B makes a generous offer,
however, he effectively transfers a large portion of the potential gains from the mechanism
back to S. These transfers make the mechanism unattractive to B’s from an expected value
standpoint.
Why do the B’s behave in a manner that renders the mechanism unprofitable for them?
One likely reason for B’s generous offers is that they have pessimistic beliefs about the
likelihood of challenges by the seller after a truthful announcement. While S challenge
truthful announcements very rarely (1 out of 90 cases after high effort; 6 out of 37 cases
after low effort), a B who believes that truthful announcements may be challenged may
choose to make a generous offer as a way of reducing the probability of a challenge. Our
belief data support the hypothesis that B’s have such pessimistic beliefs. In comparison to
the distribution of beliefs in the Main treatment where 66.1% of B’s believed that a truthful
announcement would never be challenged, only 41.7% of B’s in the High Benefits Treatment
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Figure 6: Behavior in Last 10 Periods of High-Benefits Treatment
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believe that truthful announcements would never be challenged.
The shift in pessimism and the fear of inappropriate challenges in the High-Benefits
treatment was not expected when we designed the treatment but it is consistent with B’s
believing that at least some S’s dislike unequal allocations of surplus. Unlike the Main
treatment where B’s and S’s enjoyed an equal split of surplus along the equilibrium path,
the High-Benefits treatment reduces the price that occurs without a challenge and gives B
a payoff of 90 while S receives 50. If B’s feel that S’s have a distaste for such unequal
allocations, they may make generous offers which lead to more equitable surplus splits.
Thus B’s beliefs about the distribution of other-regarding preferences in the population
could explain the fear of inappropriate challenges.12
To better understand the role that beliefs have in making generous announcements we
look at how decisions of B’s to make generous announcements depends on his belief about
being challenged after truthful announcements. Table 6 reports the results of a probit re-
gression where the dependent variable is 1 if a buyer makes a generous offer and 0 if the
buyer makes a truthful announcement. We regress this generous offer variable on B’s belief
about being challenged after a truthful announcement. Column (1) restricts the sample to
high effort, column (2) restricts the sample to low effort, and column (3) uses the combined
sample.
Beliefs about the likelihood of being challenged are a good predictor of B’s likelihood
of making a generous announcement. Based on the marginal effects of a probit regression,
B’s are 68.6 percentage points more likely to make a generous offer after high effort if they
believe that being challenged is “Likely” relative to individuals who believe that challenges of
truthful announcements will “Never” occur. Likewise, they are 99.5 percentage points more
likely to make a generous offer after low effort if they believe that truthful announcements
are “Likely.”
If the fear of inappropriate challenges is a main driver of generous announcements and
the dismissal of the mechanism, then eliminating the ability of S to challenge truthful an-
nouncements should eliminate generous offers and improve uptake of the mechanism. In the
appendix, we report on an additional No-False-Challenge Treatment where we use an
identical parametrization to the High-Benefits Treatment but augment the mechanism to
not allow truthful announcements to be challenged. We find that this treatment eliminates
generous offers in periods where high effort occurs and significantly increases truthful an-
nouncements by B’s. However, the proportion of B’s opting into the mechanism improves
only slightly and the proportion of S’s opting into the mechanism decreases. This suggests
12Note that B’s themselves do not appear to care about equity. When the mechanism does not exist
generous offers are detected in only 2 of 171 cases.
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Table 6: Probit Regression of Generous Announcements by Buyer
Buyers Belief that Seller Will Challenge Truthful Announcement:
"Unlikely" 0.483 *** 0.929 *** 0.417 ***
(0.136) (0.049) (0.135)
"Likely" 0.686 *** 0.995 *** 0.678 ***
(0.081) (0.002) (0.080)
"Always" 0.503 *** 0.965 *** 0.498 ***
(0.190) (0.016) (0.166)
Psuedo R 2 0.253 0.249 0.195
Observations 164 55 219
Marginal effects from a probit regression are reported in the table where the dependent variable is 1 if buyer makes a 
generous announcement and 0 if buyer makes a truthful announcement. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
individual.  The ommited category is Seller "Never" Challenges.  Regression (1) restricts the sample to observations with  
High Effort.  Regressions (2) restricts the sample to observations with Low Effort. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1%‐level, respecively.
High  Effort Low Effort Combined
(1) (2) (3)
that it is hard to satisfy both parties concerns about the mechanism simultaneously.
In aggregate, the High-Benefits treatment does indeed increase the probability of truthful
announcements and decrease the probability of small lies. However, B’s pessimistic beliefs
regarding the potential of being challenged leads them to make generous offers which shift
surplus away from the buyer and toward the seller. This shift in surplus eliminates B’s
incentives to use the mechanism and ultimately leads B’s to dismiss the mechanism when
the mechanism is voluntary.
6.2 Low-Fine Treatment
While the High-Benefits treatment improved truth-telling and increased the challenging of
small lies, it did not directly attempt to deal with violations in the counter-offer condition.
In this section we look at how reductions in the fine F might reduce B’s desire to reciprocate
and potentially improve the performance of the mechanism.
The large fine in the Main treatment was chosen as we were interested in testing the
general application of the Maskin and Tirole mechanism to a broad set of social choice
functions. As many applications hinge on the assumption that fines can be made arbitrarily
large, we selected a fine that was large as we expected this to increase the incentives of B’s
to be truthful. However, for the particular hold-up problem explored in the experiment, a
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smaller fine could also implement the first best in theory. If the mechanism functions better
with a smaller fine, then our results would suggest that subgame-perfect implementation
may work for problems where the fines can be kept low but may be unsuitable for cases
where they are required to be very high.
There are a number of reasons to suspect that B’s return to retaliation, r(vˆ, v, F ), may
be increasing in F . First, as F goes up, B’s losses due to a challenge increase. If B’s return
for retaliation scales with the amount he is harmed by a challenge, reducing F should reduce
his incentive to retaliate. Second, as F goes up, the amount that B can hurt S for retaliating
also increases. Thus, when the fine is lower, the amount of S’s profit that can be destroyed
by retaliation is declining. Taken together, this may well imply that a lower fine is associated
with lower psychological returns to retaliation.
To explore whether a reduced fine reduces retaliation and improves S’s incentives to
challenge small lies, we ran an additional Low-Fine Treatment in which we used the same
initial-price and counter-offer schedules as the High-Benefits treatment, but with the fine
set at 80 rather than 250. Payoffs for this treatment are the same as in Table 5. The
resulting mechanism still satisfies the Counter-Offer, Appropriate-Challenge, and Truth-
Telling conditions. Our Low-Fine treatment consists of two sessions, each with 20 subjects.
We find the following.
Result 6 In the Low-Fine treatment, S’s effort choices and B’s likelihood of making a small
lie or a truthful announcement are similar to the High-Benefits Treatment. However, follow-
ing high effort, a large proportion of B’s make the lowest possible announcement, vˆ = 100.
These “maximal lies” are more frequent among B’s who are averse to gambles and who
fear inappropriate challenges. S’s almost always challenge small lies and B’s still retaliate
against the majority of these challenges.
Figure 7 displays the results for the Low-Fine treatment with data aggregated across all
10 periods. The figure shows that S’s exert high effort in 158 out of 200 cases (79.0%), a rate
that is similar to the effort rates found in the High-Benefits treatment (74.6%). The small
difference in these effort rates is not significantly different in a regression of effort choice on
the treatment dummy with errors clustered at the individual level (p-value = 0.549).
Panel (a) shows that B’s make a small lie in only 16 out of 158 cases after high effort
and 11 out of 42 times after low effort. The aggregate small lie rate of 13.5% is similar to
that found in the High-Benefits treatment (15.7%) and not significantly different in a probit
regression where a dummy, which is 1 when an individual makes a small lie and 0 when
he makes any other announcement, is regressed on the treatment dummy (p-value = .646,
clustered by individual). B’s make truthful announcements in 23 of 42 cases after low effort
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and 46 of 158 cases after high effort. This aggregate truth-telling rate of 34.5% is lower than
the 48.8% found in the high benefits treatment, but not significantly different using the same
specification as above (p = .147, clustered by individual).
There are, however, striking differences in the announcement distribution between the
Low-Fine Treatment and the High-Benefits treatment. After high effort, B’s in the Low-Fine
treatment make maximal lies in 65 out of 158 cases (41.1%) and make generous offers in only
25 out of 158 cases (15.8%). This contrasts strongly with the maximal lie rate of 0.5% and
generous offer rate of 37.6% in the High Benefits Treatment. We discuss these maximal lies
in detail after describing actions in the other stages of the game.
Seller’s challenge rates in the Low-Fine treatment are very high, with all small lies and
all maximal lies challenged after high effort and 81.8% of small lies challenged after low
effort. The challenge rates of lies is significantly higher than the High-Benefits treatment in
a probit regression where S’s challenges are regressed on the treatment effect and the sample
is restricted to lies or small lies with errors clustered at the individual level (all lies: p-value
< .01; small lies: p-value < .01). The challenge rate of truthful announcements is higher in
the Low-Fine treatment, but not significantly different using the same probit specification
with the sample restricted to truthful announcements (p-value = .110) or both truthful and
generous announcements (p-value = .074).
Looking at the acceptance rate of counter offers shown in panel (c), in 65 of the 68 case
where B’s made large lies and were challenged, B’s accepted the counter-offer. Looking at
the beliefs of the subset of 65 B’s who made maximal lies, 69% believed they would “Always”
be challenged and the remaining 31% believed they were “Likely” to be challenged. Thus,
it appears that individuals who made these maximal lies expected to be challenged and
expected to receive the payoff of 75 from this action.
Challenges of small lies are rejected in 9 out of 16 cases after high effort and in 7 out
of 9 cases after high effort. While the aggregate rejection rate of challenges after small lies
of 64% is 15.2 percentage points lower than the High-Benefits treatment, the difference is
not significant in a probit regression that regresses the acceptance rate of small lies on the
treatment (p-value = 0.232, errors clustered by individual). This suggests that retaliation
has not been fully resolved in this treatment.
Why do the B’s in the Low-Fine treatment lie so often maximally? As with the generous
offers in the High-Benefits Treatment, a likely reason for maximal lies is a fear that a truthful
announcement would be challenged. An individual who makes a truthful announcement and
will reject an inappropriate challenge will receive 90 if he is not challenged and −80 if he is
challenged. By contrast, even if a maximal lie is always challenged, an individual making a
maximal lie is guaranteed a profit of at least 75. As this is equal to the value an individual
41
Announcement of  Buyers after Low Effort is Observed Announcement of  Buyers after High Effort is Observed
(a)  Distribution of Announcements after Low and High Effort
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Small  Lies
N = 16
Truthful 
Announcements 
N=23
Small  Lies
N = 11 Truthful 
Announcements 
N=46
(N=42) (N=158)
Generous
Announcements 
N=6
Generous
Announcements 
N=25
Maximal Lies
65
0%
5%
100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
0%
5%
100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
(b)  Likelihood of a challenge after each announcement
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Likelihood of  challenges after low effort and buyer’s 
announcement is observed
Likelihood of  challenges after high effort and buyer’s 
announcement is observed
(c) Number of challenges accepted and rejected
0%
10%
20%
30%
Less Than 
200
200 220 240 260 Greater 
than 260
0%
10%
20%
30%
100 120 Greater than       
120
Announcement Arbitration Accepted Arbitration Rejected
Less than 200 68 3
200 4 2
220 1 5
240 2 2
Announcement Arbitration Accepted Arbitration Rejected
100 2 7
120 0 10
Number of  challenges accepted and rejected
after low effort, given announcement and a seller challenge
Number of  challenges accepted and rejected
after high effort, given announcement and a seller challenge
       
260 0 3
Greater than 260 0 4
Grey boxes are predicted action when buyers do not retaliate
140 1 0
Grey boxes are predicted action when buyers do not retaliate
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Table 7: The Relationship Between Maximal Lies and Aversion to Gambles.
Truthful Announcement
Maximal Lies
Averse to Fair Gambles Accept Fair Gambles
39 12
62 1
will get for making a generous offer of 280 after high effort and not being challenged, an
individual who fears that a truthful announcement will be challenged has strong incentives
to make a maximal lie.
The hypothesis that fear of inappropriate challenges leads to maximal lies is supported
by two pieces of evidence. First, for B’s who believed that they would never be inappropri-
ately challenged, maximal lies occur in 28% of the observations. For B’s who believe that
inappropriate challenges were “Unlikely,” “Likely,” or would “Always” occur, maximal lies
occurred in 46% of the observations. Thus, those with higher beliefs of being inappropriately
challenged were substantially more likely to make maximal lies.
The hypothesis is further corroborated by relating the likelihood of a subject to make a
maximal lie to our secondary measure of aversion to gambles. Using data from our follow-up
lottery treatment, we divided subjects into two categories: those who accept all gambles for
which the expected value of the gamble was above the certain payout of zero and those who
rejected at least one of these gambles. Table 7 shows the number of observations in which
S’s exerted high effort and B’s announced either a maximal lie or the truth. B’s who do not
exhibit an aversion to fair gambles are more likely to announce truthfully than to make a
maximal lie, while those who are averse to fair gambles are more likely to make a maximal
lie. These differences are significant in a probit regression where we regress a binary variable
that is 1 if the buyer makes a maximal lie after high effort and 0 if the buyer makes a truthful
announcement after high effort on a binary variable of risk preferences that is 1 if the buyer
accepts all positive expected value gamble in the lottery game and 0 if he rejects any of them
(p-value < .01, errors clustered by individual).
As with the High-Benefits treatment, B’s in this treatment take strategic actions that
shift surplus from B to S in the mechanism due to the fear of inappropriate challenges. We
would thus expect similar opt-in and opt-out behavior in the second part of the experiment.
Result 7 B’s in the Low-Fine Treatment opt out of the mechanism in the majority of cases
and in similar proportions as seen in the High-Benefits treatment. This aversion to the
mechanism appears to be due to a fear that S’s will challenge truthful announcements.
B’s opt-out behavior is almost identical to that in the High-Benefits treatment with opt-
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out rates converging to 60% from above with an initial opt-out rate of 85%. The average
opt-out rate of 64.0% in the Low-Fine treatment is not significantly different to the average
opt-out rate of 64.6% in the High-Benefits treatment. S’s opt-out rate of 3.5% is also not
significantly different to the opt-out rate in the High-Benefits treatment. B’s who retain the
mechanism have an average return of 59.1 while B’s who opt out of the mechanism have
an average return of 74.1. This loss of profit from B’s who retain the mechanism is due
primarily to maximal lies and generous offers which transfer surplus to S.
Taken together, the Low-Fine treatment shares strong similarities to the High-Benefits
treatment. Many B’s who fear that truthful announcements will be challenged make max-
imal lies which guarantee a payoff of 75 rather than making truthful announcements. This
deviation transfers profit from B to S thereby eliminating their monetary incentive to enter
into the mechanism.
7 Conclusion
SPI mechanisms have played a key role in the debate about the foundations and the relevance
of incomplete contracts. If it were indeed possible to make all observable payoff-relevant
information verifiable by third parties, the scope for incomplete contract theory would be
radically curtailed. In this paper, we examined the performance of SPI mechanisms in the
context of a hold-up problem where they yield complete truth-telling and efficient effort
choices if they function as predicted. Because of their efficiency-enhancing properties both
parties are predicted to be better off in the presence of the mechanism and thus be willing
to adopt it voluntarily.
However, in contrast to these predictions we find that under the mechanism truth-telling
typically occurs only in the minority of the cases. We document systematic deviations of the
parties’ actual behavior from the predicted strategies: sellers are often reluctant to challenge
the buyers’ lies. When they do challenge, the buyers retaliate to this by rejecting the counter-
offer. The buyers frequently anticipate the sellers’ reluctance to challenge, which makes lying
a worthwhile strategy, and the sellers often anticipate the buyers’ retaliatory behavior, which
makes refraining from challenging rational. Taken together, this frequently leads to very bad
welfare consequences and – if given the chance – the majority of the trading pairs opt out
of the mechanism.
In response to these deviations we attempted to improve the mechanism by increasing the
buyers’ incentives for truth-telling (in the High Benefits treatment) or by decreasing their
propensity for rejecting counter-offers (in the Low Fine treatment). However, these changes
did not lead to major performance improvements. The mechanism still did not induce truth-
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telling in the majority of the cases and the welfare achieved under the mechanism remained
rather low. While the incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism alleviated some of
the problems – for example by decreasing under-reporting in the High Benefits treatment
– they also generated new ones. In a substantial number of cases the buyers feared that
even truthful announcements would be challenged. This fear led buyers to over-report the
value of the good and/or to make maximal lies, which transferred most of the additional
surplus generated from inducing high effort to the seller. The shift of surplus from buyer to
seller eliminated the buyers’ incentives to use the mechanism and ultimately led the buyers
to dismiss the mechanism in periods where it’s usage was voluntary.
Our paper explicitly documents several vulnerabilities of subgame-perfect implementa-
tion. First, the parties’ willingness to retaliate to payoff-decreasing behaviors by the other
party points to the importance of social preferences and negative reciprocity for the func-
tioning of SPI mechanisms. Recall that in our experiments the buyers could impose a large
loss on the sellers by rejecting the counteroffer at a low cost to themselves. The buyers made
frequent use of this opportunity which is one of the key reasons for the unraveling of the SPI
mechanism. In this context, it is important to point out that the low-cost of generating large
losses for other parties is not an arbitrary design choice but instead an essential characteristic
of subgame-perfect implementation in most environments – a point emphasized by Baliga
& Sjo¨stro¨m (2008).13 Thus, social preferences are likely to severely limit the efficacy of the
Maskin-Tirole mechanism and all other mechanisms with the feature that decisions of one
side of the market are used to punish or reward actions from the other side of the market.
While the first point stresses the vulnerability of SPI mechanisms to the existence of
social preferences, the second point stresses their vulnerability to irrational beliefs. Recall
that many buyers in the High Benefits and the Low Fine treatment feared that truthful
announcements will be challenged although such challenges almost never occurred. These
fears manifested themselves in different ways, depending on the size of the fine. In the
Low Fine treatment where the fine was small and the incentive compatibility constraint was
almost binding, the buyers frequently made maximal lies as a way of limiting the potential
damage that irrational partners might cause. In the High Benefits treatment where fines
were large, the buyers were willing to give up significant rents in an attempt to placate their
partner. Both approaches eliminated the surplus buyers gained by implementing the first
best outcome and led buyers to abandon the mechanism.
Our research opens two general avenues for future study. First, in relation to implemen-
13Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m write: “By changing his strategy, an agent can have a large impact on another
agent’s payoff without materially changing his own. Such mechanisms may have little hope of practical
success if agents are inclined to manipulate each others’ payoffs due to feelings of spite or kindness.”
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tation, it is an interesting theoretical question to derive optimal implementation mechanisms
in the presence of social preferences and negative reciprocity. Our work in this paper already
suggests that the distribution of payments and the size of fines are important components
in adoption, but further work is needed to more broadly understand implementation with
intention-based and other types of social preferences. Recent theoretical work by Bierbrauer
& Netzer (2014) shows that the design of optimal mechanisms can be heavily influenced by
intentions-based preferences.
Second, irrational beliefs about other parties’ also appears to be a major force in the
functioning of the mechanism considered here. This strategic risk has been given limited
attention in the theoretical literature. We conjecture that one reason simple contracts may
be the norm for exchange is that they limit the exposure of individuals to strategic risk.
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8 Appendix A: Retaliation Equilibrium
This section uses an extensive-form psychological games framework to study the expected
effects of retaliation on equilibrium play. As in Dufwenberg et. al. (2011), we use a simpli-
fied version of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) which explicitly excludes kindness and
concentrates solely on the effects of negative reciprocity. We start by studying a version of
the model where B’s and S’s are homogeneous in their level of negative reciprocity. We then
study the properties of a mixed strategy sequential-reciprocity equilibrium that exists when
there is heterogeneity in buyers’ preferences for negative reciprocity. The purpose of the
appendix is to provide a potential other-regarding preference framework that is consistent
with the empirical observation that retaliation occurs. Alternative reciprocity models in the
spirit of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) or Cox et. al. (2008) can generate similar equilibrium
predictions. Likewise, outcome-based models in which players care about the distribution of
payments, such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) can generate
predictions consistent with some of our findings.
8.1 The Baseline Model
We initially consider the exogenously imposed Maskin and Tirole mechanism when B’s and
S’s preferences for negative reciprocity are common knowledge. Let H be the set of histories
that lead to a subsequent subgame and let Ai be the set of behavioral strategies of i ∈ {B, S}
where each strategy assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible choices of i for
each history h ∈ H. Define A = ∏iAi as the set of potential strategies and let pii : A → R
denote the assignment of endnodes to monetary payoffs.
Similar to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), we assume that individuals care not only
about their monetary payoff but also care about retaliating against perceived unkind acts.
To this end, we augment an individual’s utility function with negative reciprocity payoffs.
The reciprocity payoff depends on i’s beliefs about other players’ strategies and beliefs. Let
Bij = Aj be the set of possible beliefs of player i about the strategy of player j. Let
Ciji = Bji = Ai be the set of possible beliefs of player i about the beliefs of player j’s beliefs
about player i’s own strategy.
As B’s and S’s beliefs about their counterparty’s strategy may change as play proceeds,
it is important to track how each player’s behavior, beliefs, unkindness, and perception of
others’ unkindness differ across histories. Let ai (h) be the (updated) strategy that prescribes
the same choices as ai except for the choices that define history h which are made with
probability one. Further define bij (h) as the updated beliefs about the strategies of the
other party and ciji (h) as the updated beliefs about the beliefs of the other party regarding
player i’s strategy.
For a given history h, an individual i’s expected utility is given by:
Ui (ai (h) , bij, ciji) = pii (ai (h) , bij (h)) + θi · κij (ai (h) , bij (h)) · λ¯iji (bij (h) , ciji (h))
where pii (ai (h) , bij (h)) is i’s monetary payoff and θiκijλ¯iji reflects his psychological util-
ity from retaliation. The retaliation term is made up of three components: θi ≥ 0 is a
sensitivity parameter, which reflects the relative size of monetary utility and psychologi-
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cal utility. κij (ai (h) , bij (h)) is i’s unkindness for taking action profile ai (h) and is based
on the expected monetary payoff of player j in the current subgame relative to other sub-
games that might have occurred if i had taken different actions in previous nodes. Finally,
λ¯iji (bij (h) , ciji (h)) is player i’s perception about the unkindness of player j given his current
and future actions.
In order to assess the unkindness of his potential strategies at a given history h, an
individual assesses the expected return that the other party receives from a given strategy
profile, pij (bij (h)) relative to a reference payoff pi
ref
j (bij (h)) in a linear fashion:
κij (ai (h) , bij (h)) = pij (ai (h) , bij (h))− pirefj (bij (h)) .
The reference payoff, pirefj (bij (h)), may be exogenous or based on the expected returns of
different potential actions in future subgames. For example, the reference point may be the
payments along the truth-telling path, the “equitable” splitting of the surplus 50/50 between
B and S (as in Falk and Fischbacher (2006)), or (as in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)),
a function of the material payoffs that player i believes j would receive if i had chosen a
different action profile. In the calibration exercises, we assume that the reference point is
the payments on the truth-telling path. However, our only restriction is that pirefj (bij (h)) >
min {pij (ai (h) , bij (h))| ai (h) ∈ Ai}, so that there are at least some states for which an action
is perceived as unkind.
Having defined unkindness, we now define retaliation.14 An individual forms beliefs about
the perceived unkindness of the other party based on their actions and his beliefs about the
actions the other party would have taken over all nodes. As before, define pirefj (ciji (h)) as
an exogenous or endogenous reference point about equitable payoffs and define:
λiji (bij (h) , ciji (h)) = pii (bij (h) , ciji (h))− pirefj (ciji (h)) .
We restrict attention to the case where an individual forms negative beliefs about the other
party and assume that utility is formed over λ¯iji = min {0, λiji (bij (h) , ciji (h))}, since unkind
acts are more salient in our experiment, and the experimental evidence for preferences for
reciprocity is not as strong as for negative reciprocity.
A retaliation equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 The profile a∗ = (a∗i )i∈{B,S} is a retaliation equilibrium if for all i ∈ {B, S}
and for each history h it holds that
1. a∗i (h) ∈ arg maxai∈Ai(h,a∗) Ui (ai (h) , bij (h) , ciji (h))
2. bij = a
∗
j
3. ciji = a
∗
i
14Dufwenberg et. al. (2011) call this vengeance. As we have used retaliation in the paper and differ from
their model in the choice of reference points, we have stuck with our own terminology.
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8.2 Retaliation Equilibrium with a Single Buyer Type
Having defined our model of retaliation, we now study the retaliation equilibria of the Maskin
and Tirole game when B’s and S’s preferences for negative reciprocity are known. Let θB
and θS be, respectively, B’s and S’s sensitivity parameters. Further assume that there is
common knowledge about the utility function of B and S and thus that θB and θS are
commonly known.
Recall that the timing on Maskin and Tirole’s SPI mechanism is as follows:
1. S chooses e ∈ {eL, eH}, generating a value v (e)
2. B observes v and announces vˆ
3. S can challenge (or not) vˆ
4. B can accept (or reject) the counter offer pˆ (vˆ)
In specifying an equilibrium, we begin with B’s decision to accept/reject a counter offer
for all histories in which this subgame is reached.
Lemma 1 Consider the history h = {e, vˆ, challenge} with vˆ < v. Then, for each announce-
ment vˆ, there exists a θ∗B such that for all θB ≥ θ∗B, B will reject the counter offer.
Proof. Consider S’s decision at history h = {e, vˆ}. If S does not challenge, B’s payoff is
v−p (vˆ). If S does challenge, B’s payoff is either −F in the case of rejection or v− pˆ (vˆ)−F
in the case of acceptance. By design, when vˆ < v, B’s payoff is lower after a challenge
than (i) the truth-telling path and (ii) the payment he would receive in the case that no
challenge occurred. Thus, for any possible belief S has about B’s next action, challenging is
interpreted as an unkind act by S and λBSB < 0. It follows that B will increase his utility
by decreasing the returns of S.
At the last node, rejecting the challenge is a less kind act than accepting the challenge.
Thus, at history hˆ = {e, vˆ, challenge}, B will reject if:
θBλBSB
[
κBS
(
reject|hˆ
)
− κBS
(
accept|hˆ
)]
≥ piB
(
accept|hˆ
)
− piB
(
reject|hˆ
)
.
For all lies, the right-hand side of this inequality is positive and κBS
(
reject|hˆ
)
−κBS
(
accept|hˆ
)
=
pis
(
reject|hˆ
)
− pis
(
accept|hˆ
)
is negative. Thus, there exists a θB > 0 who is indifferent be-
tween accepting and rejecting the challenge. As vˆ decreases (i.e., the lie size increases),
piB
(
accept|hˆ
)
increases and piS
(
accept|hˆ
)
decreases. Thus, the threshold θB must increase
as vˆ decreases. By the intermediate value theorem, it follows that for each announcement
vˆ, there exists a cutoff θ∗B (vˆ) such that B’s with θB ≥ θ∗B will reject the challenge of a S.
Further, the cutoff θ∗B (vˆ) is increasing as the size of the lie increases.
The above lemma shows that for each buyer type θB, there is a cutoff lie size for which
B will reject a challenge but accept a challenge for a lower announcement. Let vˆ∗ (θB) be
this cutoff lie. If θS = 0, and θB is commonly known, an announcement of vˆ
∗ (θB) will not
53
Table 8: Cutoff lies by B’s following high effort as a function of his sensitivity parameter.
vˆ∗ (θB) Main High-Benefits Low-Fine
260 [0− 0.020) [0− 0.019) [0− 0.067)
240 [0.020− 0.048) [0.019− 0.045) [0.067− 0.171)
220 [0.048− 0.078) [0.045− 0.073) [0.171− 0.283)
200 [0.078− 0.109) [0.073− 0.103) [0.283− 0.409)
180 [0.109− 0.143) [0.103− 0.134) [0.409− 0.550)
160 [0.143− 0.178) [0.134− 0.167) [0.550− 0.709)
140 [0.178− 0.216) [0.167− 0.203) [0.709− 0.891)
120 [0.216− 0.256) [0.203− 0.241) [0.891− 1.10)
100 [0.256−∞) [0.241−∞) [1.10−∞)
be challenged. B thus has an incentive to announce vˆ∗ (θB) since a larger lie will lead to a
challenge and a smaller lie will not be challenged but generates less surplus for B.
Table 8 shows the intervals of θB that generate each potential vˆ
∗ (θB) under three param-
eterizations. In order to make the intervals easily comparable, we have used the payments
on the truth-telling path as a reference point and scaled θB by 320. This is the difference in
payments between a rejected challenge after a lie and the truth-telling payment in the Main
treatment and can be thought of as normalizing θB by λBSB so that a number corresponds
to the psychic utility the buyer gains by destroying $1 of the sellers profit after a challenge.
The difference between the cutoff lie and the truth is increasing in θB and the magnitude
of θB that results in a small lie in the Main Treatment and the High-Benefits treatments
is small. By contrast, the parameter must be much higher to generate challenges in the
Low-Fine treatment.
Under most constructions of the reference points, announcements equal to this cutoff lie
and less than the truth-telling announcement will be considered unkind actions by S. This is
due to the fact that in these subgames either (i) S does not challenge or (ii) S challenges and
the challenge is rejected. As the payment to S is below the payment along the truth-telling
path and S’s payment will always be below B’s, all feasible announcements in vˆ ∈ [vˆ∗, v) are
regarded as unkind if the reference point is the payment along the truth-telling path or the
equitable split of surplus.
Table 9 shows the intervals of θS that will reject announcements at or below each po-
tential announcement threshold if it is known with probability one that B will reject. For
comparison, we have again used the truth-telling equilibrium payments as a reference point
and scaled θ by 320. The magnitude of S’s sensitivity parameter required for S to challenge
any lie that will be rejected is very large. This is due to the fact that S’s private cost of
having a challenge rejected is very high. As we will discuss in the next section, when there is
heterogeneity in the sensitivity to reciprocity, some lies in each announcement bracket may
be made by B’s who will accept a challenge. In this case, the expected loss of challenging in
equilibrium will be much lower and S’s reciprocity has much more of an expected impact.15
15For example, if there is a 50 percent chance that a challenge will be accepted, a S in the Main Treatment
will challenge an announcement of 200 if θS ≥ .487 as opposed to 7.696 in the case of 100 percent rejections.
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Table 9: Level of S’s sensitivity parameter necessary to reject an announcement and all lower
announcements.
vˆ∗ (θB) Main High-Benefits Low-Fine
260 ∞ ∞ ∞
240 27.065 24.338 27.099
220 12.495 11.243 11.733
200 7.696 6.926 6.780
180 5.333 4.800 4.406
160 3.943 3.547 3.047
140 3.035 2.729 2.188
120 2.402 2.157 1.607
100 1.939 1.739 1.195
Values shown for the case where S believes his challenge
will be rejected with probability 1.
As some of B’s lies may be challenge, B’s utility is maximized when he makes the largest
lie possible that he would reject if challenged and that the S will therefore not challenge.
By construction of the retaliation equilibrium, B’s announcement will be the one which
minimizes
vˆ = arg min
v
v
subject to (1) v ≥ v∗ and (2) US (e, v, nochallenge|e, v) ≥ US (e, v, challenge, reject|e, v).
Condition (1) simply restricts lies to the set of all lies in which B will prefer to reject the
counter offer rather than accept it. Condition (2) rules out announcements that B knows
will be challenged despite the fact that B will reject the challenge.
As we can see from B’s problem, B’s announcement is influenced both by his own sen-
sitivity parameter and by the parameter of S. If B has a large sensitivity parameter and
θS = 0, he will make very large lies and count on S not to challenge them. If on the other
hand θS > 0 and B fears that he will be challenged if he makes a sufficiently large lie, he
will reduce the size of his lie. In the extreme case where the reference point is above the
truth-telling equilibrium and θS is very large, he may make generous announcements to avoid
the cost of inappropriate challenges.
Given the fact that low announcements may be made by B, it is straightforward to see
why low effort may be an equilibrium outcome of the game. Faced with a B who has a high
sensitivity parameter, it may be the case that S prefers low effort as a way to mitigate the
effect of lies. This will be the case, for instance, if B’s optimal announcement after high
effort is less than 220.
Our retaliation equilibrium can thus rationalize the following empirical regularities:
1. Lie sizes are (weakly) increasing in the negative reciprocity of B.
2. The size of B’s lies may be constrained by S’s preferences for negative reciprocity.
3. S’s who believe B’s are reciprocal may choose low effort.
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8.3 Retaliation Equilibria with a Distribution of Types
Thus far we have discussed the retaliation equilibrium in the case of a single B and a single
S type. In this section, we demonstrate that when there is heterogeneity in the population,
a partial-pooling equilibrium may exist in which some non-reciprocal individuals pretend to
be reciprocal types. In this equilibrium, challenging a B does not lead to rejection with
probability one. As such, the cost of challenges decreases and S’s reciprocity plays a much
bigger role in shaping the equilibrium.
As our goal is illustrative, we study the simplest environment in which partial-pooling
equilibrium emerge. Consider a version of the Main treatment in which there is a fraction
µ < 1
2
of reciprocal B’s with θrB = 0.4 and a fraction 1 − µ with θnrB = 0. Further, assume
there is a single type of seller, θS, who will not challenge an announcement of 240 if B’s
reject counter offers following an announcement of 240 with probability one.
We now argue that there is no separating equilibrium or pooling equilibrium. To see that
there are no separating equilibrium, suppose that all reciprocal types choose to announce
240 and all non-reciprocal types announce 260. In this case, S will never challenge the
announcement of 240. As such, a non-reciprocal B prefers to announce 240 instead and
receive a payoff of 85 instead of 70. Thus, a set of strategies where the reciprocal types
announce 240 and the non-reciprocal types announce 260 is not an equilibrium. To see that
no pooling equilibrium exists, consider a candidate pooling equilibrium where all buyers
announce 240. In this case, a seller who challenges B will receive −370 with probability µ
and 495 with probability 1 − µ. Since µ < 1
2
, the expected value of challenging is higher
than not challenging and thus all announcements of 240 are challenged. As non-reciprocal
types would then prefer to announce 260, this also cannot be an equilibrium. Finally, the
case where all types announce 260 can not be an equilibrium since reciprocal types prefer to
announce 240 whether or not they are challenged.
While no separating and pooling equilibrium exist, a strategy in which the non-reciprocal
types mix between announcing 240 and 260 can be sustained as part of a partial-pooling
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, S’s challenge 4.48% of the time making the non-reciprocal
buyers indifferent between announcing 240 and 260. The non-reciprocal buyers mix between
announcements of 240 and 260 such that S’s receive the same utility from challenging and not
challenging.16 Reciprocal buyers always announce 240. Both reciprocal and non-reciprocal
buyers will accept counter offers for announcements below 220 and thus we assume for
convenience that S’s have an out of equilibrium belief that an announcement below 240 is
from a non-reciprocal type and that a counter-offer would be accepted.
Remark 1 When there is heterogeneity in θB, a mixed-strategy retaliation equilibrium may
exist in which non-reciprocal B’s mix between lying and making truthful announcements and
S’s mix between challenging and not challenging small lies.
While we have analyzed the mixing strategy with only two groups of B’s, we note that
the mixed-strategy retaliation equilibrium is a common outcome when there is heterogeneity
in preferences for reciprocity, and these preferences are private information. As long as there
16In the case of θS = 0, the mixing probabilities are such that a proportion
370µ
495(1−µ) of non-reciprocal
individuals announce 240. The mixing proportion decreases as θS increases.
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are some reciprocal types in the environment, it will always be the case that non-reciprocal
B’s will mimic the reciprocal types. This leads S’s to challenge some small lies and generates
destructive disagreement in equilibrium. We thus see mixing and destructive disagreement
as a near-ubiquitous feature of the SPI mechanism.
Taking the intuition from both the initial model and the extension to unobserved het-
erogeneity, our model of retaliation predicts the following:
1. Small lies are predicted to exist in all treatments. With unobserved heterogeneity,
some of these small lies will be challenged and rejected.
2. In the High-Benefits treatment, S’s have a lower cutoff sensitivity for which they are
willing to challenge a small lie. With unobserved B heterogeneity, this results in fewer
lies in equilibrium.
3. In the Low-Fine treatment, B’s require much higher levels of negative reciprocity to
reject challenges. We thus expect fewer small lies in this treatment.
4. In the High-Benefits treatment, if some S’s view the “equitable” split of surplus (rather
than the truth-telling split) as the reference point, they may challenge a truthful an-
nouncement. B’s may make generous announcements to avoid this potential outcome.
9 Appendix B: The No-False-Challenge Treatment
In the Buyer-Advantage treatment, we found that a fear of inappropriate challenges was a
potential driver for B’s to make generous announcements. In this appendix we report on
an additional control treatment that eliminates the ability of S’s to challenge B when he
has made a truthful announcement. Such a mechanism would not be feasible in practice,
because it requires that S’s action space following an announcement depends on whether
the announcement was truthful. However, here it helps to understand the extent to which
deviations from truth-telling are due to a fear of inappropriate challenges.
In the follow-up No-False-Challenge Treatment, we use an identical parametrization
to the High-Benefits Treatment but augment the mechanism with the following rules: if after
observing low effort B announces the true value of 120, he cannot be challenged, and the
game ends. Likewise, after observing high effort, if B announces the true value of 260, he
cannot be challenged, and the game ends. We conducted 3 sessions of the No-False-Challenge
Treatment with 22, 24, and 26 subjects respectively in these sessions.
Figure 8 shows the proportion of generous and truthful announcements in the High-
Benefits treatment and the No-False-Challenge treatments for both low and high effort along
with 95% confidence intervals clustered by individual. As can be seen, after both high
and low effort, there is a dramatic decrease in generous offers and a significant increase in
truthful announcements in the No-False-Challenge treatment. The treatment effects is also
significant in a probit regression that regresses a binary variable that is 1 if an individual
makes a generous announcement and 0 if an individual makes a truthful offer on the treatment
(p-value < .01, errors clustered by individual). The announcement distributions are also
significantly different in clustered version of the chi-squared test developed by Donner &
Klar (2000) (p-value < .01).
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Figure 8: Comparison of Truthful Announcements and Generous Announcements in the
High-Benefits and the No-False-Challenge Treatments
S’s challenge behavior is similar in the two treatments with 58.5% of small lies being
challenged in the High-Benefits treatment and 59.0% of small lies being challenged in the
No-False-Challenge treatment. B’s willingness to reject the challenges of small lies are also
similar with 79.2% of challenges being rejected in the High-Benefits treatment and 87.0% of
challenges being rejected in the No-False-Challenge treatment. Neither difference is signifi-
cant (S’s Challenge Behavior: p-value = .962; B’s Rejection Behavior: p-value = .544).
Given that there are less generous offers in the No-False-Challenge treatment, one might
conjecture that individuals would be less likely to opt out of the mechanism. This turns
out not to be the case: While B’s opt-out rate declines from 64.6% in the High-Benefits
treatment to 52.1% in the No-False-Challenge treatment, S’s opt-out rate increases from
3.5% to 10.2%. Thus, on net, the overall increase in retention rates is small (65.7% vs
58.2%) and not significant (p-value = .394, errors clustered by buyer).
Overall, the No-False-Challenge treatment supports the conjecture that a fear of being
challenged after an appropriate challenge is a major cause of generous announcements in the
Buyer-Advantage treatment. We leave further study of mechanisms such as this one (what
Moore (1992) calls “simple sequential mechanisms”) to future research.
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